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37 Ill. 257

Pease v. Hubbard

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided April 15, 1865

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1865-04-15

Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Bureau county; the Hon. M. E. Hollister, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case brought by Juliet Pease, a minor, by her next friend, Albert Morgan, at the December term, 1864, of the Circuit Court in Burean county, against Charles Hubbard. The facts appear in the opinion of the court.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“s a pauper. This law was designed to place the burden where it properly belongs—upon the immoral father—and prevent him from easting it either on the mother or the county.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including McCoy v. People

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1865-04-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently December 1931

4 state decisions

1018651870188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Mr. Justice Lawrence

¶1delivered the opinion of the court:

¶2The plaintiff, Juliet Pease, sued the defendant, Hubbard, who was a constable, for having negligently permitted the escape of one Kent, whom the defendant had arrested under a bastardy warrant, issued upon the complaint of the plaintiff. The defendant demurred to the declaration. The court sustained the demurrer, and upon that decision the cáse is brought before us. The single question for determination is, whether an officer, under such circumstances, is liable for the escape, to the mother of the illegitimate child.

¶3It was decided at the Ottawa term, 1864, in the case of Mann v. The People, that a prosecution under the bastardy act is a civil and not a criminal proceeding. Although in. the name of the people, yet the object is not the imposition of a penalty for an immoral act, but merely to compel the putative father to provide for the support of his illegitimate child. The father is primarily liable for the support of his offspring. In the event of his failure to perform this duty, it devolves upon the mother, and in case of her inability, the child becomes a public charge as a pauper. This law was designed to place the burden where it properly belongs, upon the immoral father, and prevent him from casting it either on the mother or the county. We are, then, wholly unable to see why this suit may not be maintained. If the officer negligently suffered the father to escape, he is liable to any one who was injured by his neglect of official duty. The plaintiff was clearly injured, because she is left liable to a. burden from which it was the duty of the escaped prisoner to relieve her, and to secure the performance of which duly he had been arrested upon her complaint.

¶4Judgment reversed.

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