¶1We address a single issue presented by these cases:
¶2The four releases were of specifically described parcels, not the land in question, and were made to Dean for consideration. The releases more particularly stated that they “shall *130not in any way affect or impair the right of [the Bank] to hold under the said mortgage and as security for the sum remaining due thereon, all the remainder of the premises therein conveyed and not hereby released.”
¶3The judge determined that notwithstanding the apparent foreclosure of the right of redemption, it was logical to interpret the matter “in accordance with the presumed intent of the [Bank and Dean].” She concluded that “the various actions taken by the Bank are inconsistent with its claim of ownership . . . and rule[d] that the parties who rely on deeds from the Bank take nothing from these conveyances.” In reaching this conclusion, the judge appears to have inferred that the partial releases and the discharge given by the Bank reflected its “true position [as] merely the holder of a security interest. . . .” She stated that her conclusion was buttressed by the failure of the Bank’s records to show ownership of vacant land, and the lapse of time during which the Bank made no conveyances. She also found of some importance that White and Butler do not appear to be bona fide purchasers for value. The Bank’s deeds to them state consideration of one dollar and the grants are made without covenants.
¶4*131The judge’s factual inferences as to the intentions of Dean and the Bank are reasonable and well supported in the record. Her conclusion of law based thereon is also well founded since “a formal foreclosure of an equity of redemption by possession and lapse of time does not prevent redemption . . . where the true understanding is that a right to redeem shall nevertheless continue to exist.” Montuori v. Bailen, 290 Mass. 72, 76 (1935). A mortgagee acquires an absolute title “after the lapse of three years from the time of . . . entry to foreclose, unless [it] waived or opened the foreclosure.” Trow v. Berry, 113 Mass. 139, 147 (1873). Where, as here, the statutory time for redemption has elapsed and the statutory provision for thereafter opening a foreclosure is not applicable,
¶5Moreover, Pub. Sts. (1882) c. 120, § 24, in force at the time of the marginal notation of discharge of the mortgage, provided that “such [marginal] entry [signed by the mortgagee] shall have the same effect as a deed of release duly acknowledged and recorded.”
¶6Accordingly, we agree with the judge’s conclusion that neither White nor Butler received anything from the deeds given them by the Bank.
¶7 Judgments affirmed.
¶8A judge of the Land Court was designated to sit simultaneously in that court and the Superior Court to hear the cases, one of which had been entered in the Land Court in 1985, and the other in the Superior Court in 1987. The separate appeals before us were taken by Butler in the Land Court action and White and the Bank in the Superior Court action. In the *129Superior Court case, White is adjudged to have acquired title by adverse possession to a small portion of the land in issue. Since Goff has not cross-appealed from this aspect of the judgment, we do not reach the adverse possession issue. See Walsh v. Chestnut Hill Bank & Trust Co., 414 Mass. 283, 289-290 (1993). We also do not consider White’s laches argument because there is nothing in the record indicating it had been raised and considered below. See Troland v. Malden, 332 Mass. 351, 356-357 (1955).
¶9The statutes governing the foreclosure by entry procedure have an early origin in the history of the Commonwealth, see Lawrence v. Fletcher, 8 Met. 153, 164 (1844), S.C., 10 Met. 344 (1845), and have been reenacted and revised from time to time.
¶10Dean gave deeds for these same parcels to others, each for the same consideration as stated in the releases to him. Two of these conveyances are dated the same date as the Bank’s releases, and two are dated prior to the releases. The circumstances might be interpreted to suggest that the Bank and Dean coordinated the disposition of these parcels in order to obtain payments against the mortgage.
¶11General Laws c. 244, § 35, the present-day version of Rev. Sts. (1836) c. 107, § 33, permits, after foreclosure of mortgages not containing a power of sale, recovery of a deficiency judgment, but such recovery “shall open the foreclosure, and the person entitled may redeem the land ... if suit for redemption is brought within one year after the recovery of such judgment.” See Lawrence v. Fletcher, 8 Met. 153, 165 (1844), S.C., 10 Met. 344 (1845); Boston v. Gordon, 342 Mass. 586, 593 (1961). We also note that G. L. c. 244, § 21, provides for tender to prevent foreclosure under certain circumstances, provided the mortgagor commences suit for redemption. In the present case we are concerned, however, not with the operation of statutory provisions, but whether an agreement of the parties can be inferred in order to decide whether a redemption was effected.
¶12The present-day statute, G. L. c. 183, § 54, was amended by St. 1951, c. 698, eliminating reference to marginal notations of discharge. As further amended by St. 1984, c. 401, the section now states, in pertinent part: “The recordation of a duly executed and acknowledged deed of release or written acknowledgment of payment or satisfaction as provided herein shall be conclusive evidence that the mortgage has been discharged . . . .”
¶13We intimate no opinion as to the effect, in the circumstances, had there been a good faith, diligent exercise of the power of sale pursuant to the statutory predecessors of G. L. c. 244, §§ 14-15, prior to the acts relied on by the judge as evidencing inconsistency with ownership. See G. L. c. 244, § 18. It has long been “common practice for mortgagees to use both [the foreclosure by entry and foreclosure by power of sale] methods concurrently,” Harlow Realty Co. v. Cotter, 284 Mass. 68, 69-70 (1933), since “proper execution of the former obviates any defects in the latter.” Hull v. Attleboro Sav. Bank, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 19 & n.3 (1992). See also Grabiel v. Michelson, 297 Mass. 227, 228-229 (1937); Park, Real Estate Law § 532 (2d ed. 1981).