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← 37 Misc. 2d 455 - People v. Pupillo

37 Misc. 2d 455 - People v. Pupillo’s Empirical Analysis

1962

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
2
states following
October 1996
most recently cited

2 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently October 1996

2 district · 4 state decisions

201962197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on State v. Magaha · 164 Pa. Super. 449 - Commonwealth v. Klick · Mulkern v. State · People v. Love · People v. Lukowsky

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The real test must be if or not the statute is of sufficient definiteness to advise the person that under certain circumstances he may be called upon to have his act or omission to act determined a violation of the law. The statute requires that the operator of a car shall not proceed at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. This test can be applied in evaluating the act or acts or omission to act under conditions that are actual and potential hazards at certain speeds. It is always a question of fact to be determined on all the evidence before the Court if or not the case comes within the purview of the statute. Every person knows that under certain conditions the speed of a car can be dangerous and hazardous to the occupant and others using the public highway or property adjoining the same. The statute as worded is an adequate standard by which a driver’s conduct can be tested and is, therefore, held to be no abridgement of the constitutional rights of the said defendant. 235 N.Y.S.2d at 525 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “A. No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, conditions, and actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event, speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to exercise reasonable care for the protection of others. B. Except as provided in subsections C and D or where a special hazard requires a lesser speed, any speed in excess of these speeds shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is too great and therefore unreasonable and unlawful: 1. Fifteen miles per hour approaching school crossing. 2. Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or residential district. 3. Sixty-five miles per hour in other locations. C. The speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized in §§ 28-702 and 28-703. D. The maximum lawful speed as provided in this section shall be reduced to that which is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, such as when: 1. Approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad crossing. 2. Approaching and going around a curve. 3. Approaching a hill crest. 4. Traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway. 5. Special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. E. No perso”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.