37 Ohio App. 2d 29 - Levin v. Nielsen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 6 district · 36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Pursuant to the Certificate of Title Act], [n]o court may recognize title in anyone save one who holds and proves a duly issued certificate of title, or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate of origin. . . . But these restrictions do not preclude or nullify the effect of a purported warranty or guaranty of title, (citations omitted) We are not obliged to conclude, ipso facto, that no one else is entitled to have title transferred to himself, or that the General Assembly meant to require that automobile purchasers rely solely on a dealer’s moral commitment to complete his part of the bargain. The Certificate of Title Act was adopted to protect innocent purchasers, and to allow the public to rely on duly issued evidence of title. It was not meant to, and does not prevent a court of equity from ordering that title be transferred if the holder has bound himself to do so, directly or through an agent. •”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 192 N.J. Super. 366 - Shannon v. Snedeker · 192 N.J. Super. 189 - Martin v. Nager

2. “(A) Except as otherwise provided in division (E) of this section, a buyer in the ordinary course of business, other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations, takes free of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence. (B) Except as otherwise provided in division (E) of this section a buyer of goods from a person who used or bought the goods for the use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes takes free of a security interest, even if perfected, if the buyer buys: (1) Without knowledge of the security interest; (2) For value; (3) Primarily for the buyer’s personal, family, or household purposes; and (4) Before the filing of a financing statement covering the goods.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 159 Ohio App. 3d 179 - First Merit Bank, N.A. v. Angelini · 192 N.J. Super. 189 - Martin v. Nager

3. “The Certificate of Title Act was adopted to protect innocent purchasers, and to allow the public to rely on duly issued evidence of title. It was not meant to, and does not prevent a court of equity from ordering that title be transferred if the holder has bound himself to do so, directly or through an agent. Cf. the facts and limitation in Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler (1951), 155 Ohio St. 541 , 99 N.E.2d 665 ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer (1964), 176 Ohio St. 1 , 197 N.E.2d 343 , as overruled in part, Hardware Mut’l Casualty Co. v. Gall (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 261 , 240 N.E.2d 502 . * * * * * * A dealer having authority to expose floor-planned cars for sale in the ordinary course of business binds his mortgagee to deliver title to any car so sold, when payment is made to the dealer and whether or not the dealer remits the proceeds to his mortgagee, unless the buyer knows or should have known of the financing arrangements, or unless the contract of sale can and does expressly limit the warranty given. Cf. Fouke v. Commercial Credit Corp. (Montgomery Co., 1962), 116 Ohio App. 145 , 187 N.E.2d 160 . As we pointed out in Mutual Finance Co. v. Kozoil, supra, 111 Ohio App. 501, 514 , 165 N.E.2d 444 , R.C. 4505.13 does not protect a security interest under the foregoing circumstances. Levin v. Nielsen, supra at 33-34 , 306 N.E.2d at 179 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commercial National Bank of Tiffin v. Reedman Chevrolet, Inc.