¶1Decided 15 August, 1900.
¶2On Petition for Rehearing.
¶3For petitioner there was a brief over the name of Mr. Chas. A. Cogswell.
¶4delivered the opinion of the court.
¶5
¶6The statute, in prescribing the person who is entitled to the possession of real property upon a judicial sale thereof, provides that the purchaser, from the day of sale until a resale or redemption, and a redemptioner from the day of his redemption until another redemption, shall be entitled to the possession of the property purchased or redeemed, unless the same be in the possession of a tenant holding under an unexpired lease, and in such case shall be entitled to receive from such tenant the rents or the value of the use and occupation thereof during the same period : Hill’s Ann. Laws, § 307. Tt is stipulated that the grain so mortgaged by Hall was rental due from Hammond under the lease. “The word ‘due,’” says Mr. Justice Ewing, in Scudder v. Scudder, 10 N. J. Law, 340, “has more than one signification, or is used on different occasions to express distinct ideas. At times it signifies a simple indebtedness, without reference to the time of payment. Debitum in preesenti, sohendum in futuro.’ At other times it shows that the day of payment or render has passed.” In United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 29, Mr. Justice Story, in defining the word “due,” says : “It is sometimes used to express the mere state of indebtedness, and then is an equivalent to ‘owed’ or ‘owing ;’ and it is sometimes used to express the fact that the debt has become payable.” In Carr v. Thompson, 67 Mo. 472, it was held that the word “due” was improperly used for “owing.” As illustrating this definition, see, also, Leggett v. Bank, 25 Barb. 326 ; Allen v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476 (57 Am. Dec. 542). If it be assumed that the words “rental due,” as used in the stipulation, are synonymous with “rent accrued,” Hall could have entered and taken the quantity of wheat to which he was entitled, before it was harvested ; but, *479as such a method of securing the proper quantity would have been impracticable, we think that the parties meant by the use of that term that the wheat so taken by the defendant was the quantity which was ascertained to be due Hall after the grain was harvested and threshed. Having reached the conclusion that the rent was not due Hall until after the grain was harvested, which occurred after plaintiff purchased the land, but before she was entitled to the possession thereof, the rent of the premises was due her, and not Hall; for the rule is well settled that when land is leased in consideration of a part of the crop that may be raised thereon, and the lease does not contain any stipulation as to when such share is payable, it is due when the crop is harvested, or within a reasonable time thereafter : Toler v. Seabrook, 39 Ga. 14 ; Lamberton v. Stouffer, 55 Pa. St. 284; Long v. Seavers, 103 Pa. St. 517; Brown v. Adams, 35 Tex. 447. The rent thus reserved having accrued after the sale of the prem-. ises, the plaintiff was entitled to the same, and hence we are compelled to adhere to our former opinion.
¶7Rehearing Denied.