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← 37 Va. App. 687 - McNair v. Commonwealth

37 Va. App. 687 - McNair v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

2002

Citation profile

9
cited by 9 later decisions
2
states following
August 2017
most recently cited

7 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Faretta v. California · Gideon v. Wainwright · Edwards v. Arizona · Cuyler v. Sullivan · Powell v. State of Alabama Patterson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"It logically follows that such conduct may operate as a constructive discharge of counsel whether retained or appointed, or a de facto waiver of the right to be represented by such counsel. In either case, a trial court is not bound by constitutional mandate to appoint another attorney, or provide the defendant with an additional opportunity to secure counsel. Instead, courts are accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances to enable a defendant to secure new counsel. See Sampley [v. Attorney General of North Carolina ], 786 F.2d [610,] at 613 [(4th Cir.1986)] (`[t]he constitutional right is probably best stated as a limit on trial court discretion: that discretion only exceeds its constitutional bounds when it is exercised to deny a continuance on the basis of an "unreasoning and arbitrary `insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay'"') (quoting Ungar[ v. Sarafite ], 376 U.S. [575,] at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841 [(1964)].")”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel, while fundamental, is not a right without limitation. Specifically, it is not a right subject to endless abuse by a defendant. Instead, the right is qualified in its exercise and merely affords a defendant an absolute right to a “fair opportunity” to representation by counsel. Sampley v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 786 F.2d 610, 613 (4th Cir.1986). This limitation derives from the important and valid state interest in proceeding with prosecutions in an orderly and expeditious manner, taking into account the practical difficulties of “ ‘assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time’ ” as well as the concerns and interests of the victims, witnesses and general public, and the appropriate use of judicial resources.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “[A] defendant has no constitutional right to dictate the time, if ever, at which he is willing to be tried by simply showing up without counsel, or with allegedly unsatisfactory counsel, whenever his case is called for trial, ... or by objecting that counsel then retained or assigned is not presently `counsel of his choice.'”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.