¶1Mr. J. David Mann, Jr., Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) with *490whom Mr. Mario F. Escudero, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
¶2Mr. Robert Kenly Webster, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.
¶3Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and Fahy and McGowan, Circuit Judges.
¶5Appellant was convicted of carrying a concealed pistol without a license, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-3204. His appeal raises initially a question as to the validity of his arrest. If it were unlawful, he contends, an incriminating statement and a pistol, which were admitted in evidence, should have been excluded as the fruit of the arrest. Since we hold that the arrest, which occurred as now explained, was lawful this contention cannot prevail.
¶6Two police officers in mufti were cruising shortly before midnight. They saw appellant run from the doorway of a church, cross the church property to the sidewalk, and then cross the street. They drove to a point where they were able to accost appellant as he approached. One of the officers testified that he identified himself as a policeman and told appellant he wished to speak to him. The officer testified appellant backed away, said, “Oh no,” and addressed him in vilely obscene language. Two other officers, summoned by police radio, approached appellant from the rear. He thereupon sped ahead between the officers to his front. He was soon overtaken and arrested by two of the officers, and thereafter a fifth officer was called to transport appellant to the police station where he was to be booked for disorderly conduct. The obscene language addressed to the officer in the circumstances of appellant’s conduct above set forth supports the arrest. D.C.Code §§ 4-140, 22-1107.
¶7Appellant urges that his arrest for disorderly conduct was a sham, employed by the police as “a gamble for detecting a larger crime.” See Hutcherson v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 281, 345 F.2d 964, 971, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894, 86 S.Ct. 188, 15 L.Ed.2d 151 (1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion). This issue is “one for inference to be drawn by the fact-finder based upon credibility and demeanor.” Id., at 282, 345 F.2d, at 972. But the question was not raised below, and the record does not reveal plain error. We therefore conclude that appellant’s statement was not inadmissible on the theory that his arrest was a sham.
¶8Since the conviction on appeal was not for disorderly conduct but for carrying a concealed weapon without a license we now explain how this charge came about.
¶9As the officer reached the police station with appellant, there also arrived a police radio message indicating that a gun had been found by the officer who first accosted appellant as above set forth.1 About two minutes later the transporting officer asked appellant about the discovery. This officer testified appellant said he had found a gun shortly before the incidents we have described and that he had dropped it during the chase. Thereafter appellant identified the gun, later admitted in evidence, as the gun he had dropped.
¶10 A motion to suppress was heard and denied prior to trial. As the trial itself was getting underway appellant’s counsel renewed, to quote his words, “that motion to suppress the evidence which was seized and the pistol in the case.” This motion was based explicitly by counsel upon the alleged unlawfulness of the arrest. At no time was any other basis stated for inadmissibility of the chal*491lenged evidence. Since, as we hold, the arrest was lawful the evidence was not inadmissible on the ground asserted. In any event this is not a case for the application of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; and the record affords no basis for applying Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, also referred to on appeal for the first time.2
¶11Affirmed.