Price v. US’s Empirical Analysis
Citation profile
6 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 67 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2022 · most notably Schwab v. Reilly (2010), In Re Donald (2006)
6 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 521
Relies on Warth v. Seldin · Connecticut National Bank v. Germain · United States v. W. T. Grant Co. · Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. · United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 , 117 S.Ct. 843 , 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Statutory context can suggest the natural reading of a provision that in isolation might yield contestable interpretations. Specifically, in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to declare its provisions ambiguous, preferring instead to take a broader, contextual view, and urging courts to “not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 , 107 S.Ct. 353 , 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc)....”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“The trouble lies with the phrase “if applicable.” Do those words merely indicate that the three options — exemption, redemption, and reaffirmation — are relevant when a debtor intends to retain and not applicable when a debtor chooses to surrender the collateral? If so, section 521(2)(A) [now 521(a)(2)(A) ] sets out an exhaustive set of retention options. Or does “if applicable” mean “if” the debtor wishes to choose any of the three options that follow on its heels, i.e., when redemption, reaffirmation, and exemption “apply,” that intention must be specifically stated? If the latter construction is correct, then section 521(2)(A) leaves available other methods of retention, such as by keeping the loan current.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. In Re Chubb · In re Gregory“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme — because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, ... or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”). 5 . Other examples of when the three retention options would not be applicable according to their own terms include:”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. In Re Chubb
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.