Morrill v. Gallagher’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In this case, the central issue is whether Linebaugh, then twenty-one years old, intended to injure Berdish, then fourteen, when he allegedly had sexual intercourse with her. Unless the intent to injure can be inferred as a matter of law, a genuine issue of fact regarding Linebaugh’s intentions remains and summary judgment under this rule would be improper. Thus, if we decide that intent to injure can be inferred, as a matter of law, summary judgment was proper because coverage under the policy in question excludes intentional injuries. The cases in Michigan concerning exclusions from homeowner’s insurance coverage have generally construed one of two policy forms. Many older cases, in particular, have concerned exclusions for “injury, sickness, disease, death, or destruction caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured”, which is approximately the wording of the policy in this case. The homeowner’s policy issued by Transamerica to Linebaugh’s parents provides that Transamerica will indemnify its insureds against “occurrences” which are accidentally caused. The policy states in part: “Section II. Comprehensive Personal Liability, definition * * * * # * “(b) Occurrence. ‘Occurrence’ means an accident, or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in injury during the Policy Period, provided the injury is accidentally caused. All damages arising out of such exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 652 F. Supp. 1177 - State Auto Mutual Insurance v. McIntyre Ex Rel. Buck

2. “Some emphasis is placed on [the intentional injury exclusion] on the ground that in the instant case the firecracker was thrown intentionally. Unquestionably such was the case, but it will be noted that under the language of the excluding clause the injury must be caused “intentionally.” There is nothing in this case to justify a conclusion that either Gallagher or Canfield intended to cause any physical harm to plaintiff. The language of the policy is binding on appellant, and if ambiguous it must be construed against appellant’s claims in the instant controversy. It may not be interpreted as barring liability under the policy.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.