State v. Huey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hen defense counsel fails to object to the prosecutor's improper argument and the trial court fails to intervene, the standard of review requires a two-step analytical inquiry: (1) whether the argument was improper; and, if so, (2) whether the argument was so grossly improper as to impede the defendant's right to a fair trial.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 266 N.C. App. 193 - State v. Cagle · 256 N.C. App. 112 - State v. Madonna

2. “[A]lthough control of jury argument is left to the discretion of the trial judge, trial counsel must nevertheless conduct themselves within certain statutory parameters. It is improper for lawyers in their closing arguments to become abusive, inject their personal experiences, express their personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, or make arguments on the basis of matters outside the record. Within these statutory confines, we have long recognized that prosecutors are given wide latitude in the scope of their argument and may argue to the jury the law, the facts in evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. If an argument is improper, and opposing counsel fails to object to it, the second step of the analysis requires a showing that the argument is so grossly improper that a defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to intervene. Our standard of review dictates that only an extreme impropriety on the part of the prosecutor will compel this Court to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument that defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when originally spoken. It is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. For an appellate court to order a new trial, the relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial wit”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 256 N.C. App. 112 - State v. Madonna · 262 N.C. App. 308 - State v. DeGraffenried

3. “In other words, the reviewing court must determine whether the argument in question strayed far enough from the parameters of propriety that the trial court, in order to protect the rights of the parties and the sanctity of the proceedings, should have intervened on its own accord.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 261 N.C. App. 735 - State v. Wardrett · State v. Barbour