State v. Knowles’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The Supreme Court of California, relying on Robinson v. Neil , 409 U.S. 505 , *Page 302 93 S.Ct. 876 , 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973), held Breed fully retroactive and reversed a conviction where both the juvenile hearing and the adult trial preceded May 27, 1975. In re Bryan , 16 Cal.3d 782 , 129 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 548 P.2d 693 (1976). In contrast, finding Robinson v. Neil, supra , distinguishable, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held Breed prospective only. Stokes v. Commonwealth , Mass., 336 N.E.2d 735 (1975). Further, the Massachusetts Court determined that the crucial event in terms of the application of Breed was the juvenile hearing rather than the criminal trial (as if an adult), reasoning that official reliance attached at the juvenile level: `It was at that moment that the situation became irreversible, for by subjecting the defendant to former jeopardy in the . . . (juvenile court), any subsequent trial would necessarily constitute double jeopardy under the reasoning of Breed.' Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2) , Mass., 351 N.E.2d 521 , 525 (1976). Thus, under the approach of the Massachusetts Court, Breed does not bar the adult trial after May 27, 1975, of a juvenile subjected to former jeopardy at an omnibus hearing held before May 27, 1975. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), supra." State v. Knowles , Me., 371 A.2d 624 , 627 (1977).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 368 So. 2d 298 - Smith v. State

2. ““We decide that in those situations, as here, in which the statutory use of the word ‘unlawfully’ is only to negative the existence of legal justification or excuse for the conduct otherwise defined to be criminal, an indictment is not fatally defective because it fails to use the statutory word “unlawfully.” In such context the very existence of the charging instrument sufficiently serves the purpose intended by the statute since the fact that a charging instrument has been returned against defendant conveys to him the information that the State deems the conduct described in the indictment to be a crime, thus to be conduct neither justified nor excused in legal contemplation.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Blais