Steward v. Statler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Generally, retroactivity is a matter of legislative intent, and unless it expressly states otherwise, we presume the legislature intends for its laws to apply only prospectively. Any interpretation of an act must be aimed at determining whether retroactive effect is stated or implied so clearly and unequivocally as to eliminate any doubt. In determining legislative intent, we have observed a strict rule of construction against retroactive operation and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it, to operate prospectively only and not retroactively. However, this rule does not ordinarily apply to procedural or remedial legislation. The strict rule of construction does not apply to remedial statutes that do not disturb vested rights, or create new obligations, but only supply a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right or obligation. Procedural legislation is more often given retroactive application. The cardinal principle for construing remedial legislation is for the courts to give appropriate regard to the spirit which promoted its enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished, and the remedy proposed. Although the distinction between remedial procedures and impairment of vested rights is often difficult to draw, it has become firmly established that there is no vested right in any particular mode of procedure or remedy. Statutes which do not 1 ^create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy contractual or”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. J-McDaniel Construction Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd.

2. “Until the enactment of Act 438, it has been well-settled law, since Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-102 (b) was enacted in 1949, that letters of administration are necessary to vest in a personal representative or special administrator the authority to sue or be sued. In Jenkins ..., our court explicitly stated that “[n]othing can be read into either [ Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-102 (b)] or [ Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-104 ] which would authorize a personal representative to sue or be sued until such time as he has received letters of administration.” The Arkansas Court of Appeals reiterated the law in Filyaw..., with the pronouncement that “[u]ntil the issuance of the letters, appellant [personal representative] had no standing under Jenkins to file suit.’J 1 ] However, the General Assembly’s enactment of Act 438 repeals the Arkansas Probate Code’s long-standing provision establishing the legal commencement of a probate proceeding, ... by implication. While it is true that repeals by implication are not favored, . . . , a repeal by implication does transpire when there exists an “invincible repugnancy” between the earlier and the later statutory provisions. Here, the later statute, Act 438 declares letters of administration to be unnecessary so long as there is an order appointing the administrator; whereas, the earlier statute, . . . conditions the legal commencement of a probate proceeding upon the issuance of letters.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 101 Ark. App. 156 - Estate of Banks v. Wilkin

3. “(b) The [probate] proceedings shall be deemed commenced by the filing of a petition, the issuance of letters, and the qualification of a personal representative. The proceeding first legally commenced is extended to all of the property in this state.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 101 Ark. App. 156 - Estate of Banks v. Wilkin