United States v. Dhingra’s Empirical Analysis
371 F.3d 557 · 2004
Citation profile
24 federal appellate · 10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 59 later decisions — most recently December 2024 · most notably United States v. Tykarsky (2006), Lo, Ex Parte John Christopher (2013)
24 federal appellate · 10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (White-Slave Traffic Act of 1910 (Mann Act)) · 47 U.S.C. § 223
Relies on Hamling v. United States · Miller v. California · Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union · Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission · Ashcroft Attorney General v. American Civil Liberties Union et al.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“knowingly persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or coerc[ing] any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“For example, [§ 2422(b) ] would not criminalize speech that is received by minors but is not spoken with the intent to persuade, induce, entice or coerce a minor into illegal sexual activity. In this delineation between criminal and lawful behavior lies a key distinction between the CDA provision considered in Reno and § 2422(b). The CDA criminalized speech—even if directed to a general audience—once it became known to the speaker that a minor was accessing the information. Because the speaker’s burden of restricting minors’ access to otherwise legitimate speech would be so great, the statute effectively silenced the speaker altogether, imposing an impermissible content-based blanket restriction that included legitimate adult communication. In comparison, as a functional matter, § 2422(b) requires that an adult cease inducement for sex once he becomes aware that the object of his inducement is a minor—hardly a burden to legitimate speech, as the statute does not prevent the speaker from communicating with other adults.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““[T]he victim’s willingness to engage in sexual activity is irrelevant, in much the same way that a minor’s consent to sexual activity does not mitigate the offense of statutory rape or child molestation.” Nothing in the record suggests that the girls were inclined to engage in commercial sex acts before they met Brooks and Fields, and counsel’s suggestion at oral argument that the girls were “giving it away” is not well taken. ... [T]he record supports the conclusion that both Fields and Brooks unduly influenced the girls to engage in prostitution.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.