IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 271PA15-2
Filed 17 August 2018
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
FELIX RICARDO SALDIERNA
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 803 S.E.2d 33 (2017), reversing an order
denying defendant’s motion to suppress entered on 20 February 2014 by Judge
Forrest Donald Bridges, vacating a judgment entered on 4 June 2014 by Judge Jesse
B. Caldwell, both in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, and remanding the case
for further proceedings after the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the
Court of Appeals’ prior decision in this case, State v. Saldierna,
242 N.C. App. 347,
775 S.E.2d 326 (2015). Heard in the Supreme Court on 14 May 2018 in session in the
Old Burke County Courthouse in the City of Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-
10(a).
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Goodman Carr, PLLC, by W. Rob Heroy, for defendant-appellee.
ERVIN, Justice.
STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
The issue before the Court in this case is whether the trial court’s order
denying defendant’s suppression motion contained sufficient findings of fact to
support its conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile
rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 before making certain incriminating
statements. After careful consideration of defendant’s challenge to the denial of his
suppression motion in light of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the
trial court’s order contained sufficient findings to support this conclusion and reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary.
From 26 November 2012 to 3 January 2013, defendant Felix Ricardo Saldierna
and seven other individuals were involved in a series of breakings and enterings that
occurred in the Charlotte area. After coming home from work on 17 December 2012,
Cheryl Brewer1 discovered that someone had entered her residence through a broken
window, scrawled “Merry Chritmas” [sic] across a wall, and stolen a 32-inch television
and a lock box. On 18 December, a 42-inch television, an Xbox game system, and
jewelry were stolen from the residence of William Nunez. Another individual
suspected in the commission of these crimes told investigating officers that defendant
had been involved in the underlying break-ins. In January 2013, warrants for arrest
charging defendant with felonious breaking or entering and conspiracy to commit
1 The name of the victim set out in the text of this opinion is derived from the factual
basis statement provided by the prosecutor at the time that defendant entered his negotiated
guilty plea. The indictment returned against defendant in the relevant cases named the
alleged victim as Cheryl Drew.
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Opinion of the Court
breaking or entering were issued. Based upon the issuance of these warrants for
arrest, defendant was taken into custody at his home in Fort Mill, South Carolina.
After having been placed under arrest, defendant was transported to the York
County Justice Center, where he was interviewed by Detective Aimee Kelly of the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. At the beginning of this interview,
Detective Kelly informed defendant that she was required to inform him of his rights.
Defendant responded to Detective Kelly’s statement by telling her that “my English
is good, but like when you say something like that much it’s kind of confusing.” After
stating that he was sixteen years old, defendant informed Detective Kelly that he was
taking courses intended for both freshman and sophomore high school students.
When Detective Kelly asked defendant if he could read, defendant responded in the
affirmative before adding that he could read English “kind of, a little bit,” and that
he could read Spanish. At that point, Detective Kelly told defendant that she would
provide him with a copy of a juvenile rights waiver form in both English and Spanish
so that he would be able to read along with her while she informed him of his rights.
At the conclusion of this portion of their discussion, Detective Kelly and defendant
had the following exchange:
[Kelly]: You understand I’m a police officer, right?
[Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am[.]
[Kelly]: Ok, and that I would like to talk to you about this.
And this officer has also explained to me and I understand
that I have the right to remain silent, that means that I
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Opinion of the Court
don’t have to say anything or answer any questions.
Should be right there number 1 right on there. Do you
understand that?
[Defendant]: [unintelligible] questions?
[Kelly]: Yes, that is your right? So do you understand that?
If you understand that, put your initials right there
showing that you understand that. On this sheet. On this
one. You can put it on both. Anything I say can be used
against me. Do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am.
[Kelly]: I have the right to have a parent[,] guardian or
custodian here with me now during questioning. Parent
means my mother, father, stepmother, or stepfather.
Guardian means the person responsible for taking care of
me. Custodian means the person in charge of me where I
am living. Do you understand that? Do you want to read
that?
[Defendant]: Yeah.
[Kelly]: Do you understand that?
[Defendant]: [no response]
[Kelly]: I have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have a
lawyer here with me now to advise and help during
questioning. Do you understand that?
[Defendant]: [unintelligible]
[Kelly]: If I want to have a lawyer with me during
questioning one will be provided to me at no cost before any
questioning. Do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am.
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Opinion of the Court
[Kelly]: Ok. Now I want to talk to you about some stuff
that’s happened in Charlotte. And um, I will tell you this.
There’s been some friends of yours that have already been
questioned about these items and these issues. And
they’ve been locked up. And that’s what I want to talk to
you about. Do you want to help me out and to help me
understand what’s been going on with some of these cases
and talk to me about this now here?
[Defendant]: Uh
[Kelly]: Are you willing to talk to me is what I’m asking.
[Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am.
[Kelly]: Ok. So I am 14 years or more. Let me see that pen.
And I understand my rights as they’ve been explained by
[D]etective Kelly. I do wish to answer questions now
without a lawyer, parent, guardian or custodian here with
me? My decision to answer questions now is made freely
and is my own choice. No one has threatened me in any
way or has promised me any special treatment because I
have decided to answer questions now. I am signing my
name below. Do you understand this? Initial, sign, date
and time.
[Kelly]: It is 1/9/13. It is 12:10PM.
[Defendant]: Um, Can I call my mom?
[Kelly]: Call your mom now?
[Defendant]: She’s on her um. I think she is on her lunch
now.
[Kelly]: You want to call her now before we talk?
[Kelly] [to other officers]: He wants to call his mom.
....
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Opinion of the Court
[Other Officer]: [S]tep back outside and we’ll let you
call your mom outside. . . .
....
9:50: [Defendant] [can be heard on phone. Call is not
intelligible.]
....
[Kelly]: 12:20: Alright Felix, so, let’s talk about this thing
going on. Like I said a lot of your friends have been locked
up and everybody’s talking. They’re telling me about
what’s going on and what you’ve been up to. I’m not saying
you’re the ringleader of this here thing and some kind of
mastermind right but I think you’ve gone along with these
guys and gotten yourself into a little bit of trouble here.
This is not something that’s going to end your life. You
know what I’m saying. This is not a huge deal. I know you
guys were going into houses when nobody was home. You
weren’t looking to hurt anybody or anything like that. I
just want to hear your side of the story. We can start off.
I’m going to ask you questions I know the answer to. A lot
of these questions are to tell if you’re being truthful to me.
At that point, Detective Kelly interviewed defendant for approximately fifty-four
minutes concerning the extent of his involvement in the commission of the crimes
that Detective Kelly was investigating. During the course of the ensuing
interrogation, defendant confessed to having been involved in the break-ins that had
occurred at the residences of Ms. Brewer and Mr. Nunez.
On 22 January 2013, the Mecklenburg County grand jury returned bills of
indictment charging defendant with two counts of conspiracy to commit felonious
breaking, entering, and larceny and two counts of felonious breaking or entering. On
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Opinion of the Court
9 October 2013, defendant filed a motion seeking to have his confession and all of the
evidence that the State had obtained as a result of the statements that defendant
made to Detective Kelly suppressed on the grounds that his confession had been
obtained as the result of violations of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 and his federal
constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. According
to defendant, “[b]y asking to speak to his mother prior to questioning, [d]efendant
invoked his rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101.” In addition, defendant alleged that, in
light of his “indicat[ion] that he was not ready to be questioned without her,” “[t]he
interview should have ceased at that moment and not continued until [d]efendant’s
mother was present, or should have simply ceased.”
On 31 January 2014, defendant’s suppression motion came on for hearing
before Judge Forrest Donald Bridges in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. At
the suppression hearing, Detective Kelly testified that, while defendant “spoke
English clearly and understood what [she] was saying,” “[he] said he wasn’t very good
at reading English.” Although Detective Kelly acknowledged that defendant might
have claimed to have had “some issues understanding English,” she stated that
defendant “seemed to very clearly understand what [she] was asking him” and that
she had had no trouble understanding defendant at any point during the interview.
Detective Kelly “found [defendant’s English] to be fine” and believed “that he
understood [his juvenile] rights.” According to Detective Kelly, defendant followed
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Opinion of the Court
along and initialed the relevant portions of the juvenile rights waiver form while she
read his juvenile rights to him.
In addition, Detective Kelly asserted at the suppression hearing that
defendant “never said he wanted his mother [at the interview].” On the other hand,
Detective Kelly did not ask defendant “whether or not he was ready to proceed” after
he requested to be allowed to speak with his mother. In fact, defendant had signed
the juvenile rights waiver form before asking the investigating officers to give him an
opportunity to call his mother. Detective Kelly had an “understanding” that
defendant had called his mother “to let her know where he was and that he was
arrested.”
On 20 February 2014, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s
suppression motion in which the court found as a fact:
1. That Defendant was in custody.
2. That Defendant was advised of his juvenile rights
pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 7B-2101.
3. That Detective Kelly of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department advised Defendant of his juvenile
rights.
4. That Defendant was advised of his juvenile rights in
three manners. Defendant was advised of his juvenile
rights in spoken English, in written English, and in written
Spanish.
5. That Defendant indicated that he understood his
juvenile rights as given to him by Detective Kelly.
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Opinion of the Court
6. That Defendant indicated he understood his rights
after being given and reviewing a form enumerating those
rights in Spanish.
7. That Defendant indicated that he understood that
he had the right to remain silent. Defendant understood
that to mean that he did not have to say anything or
answer any questions. Defendant initialed next to this
right at number 1 on the English rights form provided to
him by Detective Kelly to signify his understanding.
8. That Defendant indicated he understood that
anything he said could be used against him. Defendant
initialed next to this right at number 2 on the English
rights form provided to him by Detective Kelly to signify
his understanding.
9. That Defendant indicated he understood that he had
the right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian there
with him during questioning. Defendant understood the
word parent meant his mother, father, stepmother, or
stepfather. Defendant understood the word guardian
meant the person responsible for taking care of him.
Defendant understood the word custodian meant the
person in charge of him where he was living. Defendant
initialed next to this right at number 3 on the English
rights form provided to him by Detective Kelly to signify
his understanding.
10. That Defendant indicated he understood that he had
the right to have a lawyer and that he had the right to have
a lawyer there with him at the time to advise and help him
during questioning. Defendant initialed next to this right
at number 4 on the English rights form provided to him by
Detective Kelly to signify his understanding.
11. That Defendant indicated he understood that if he
wanted a lawyer there with him during questioning, a
lawyer would be provided to him at no cost prior to
questioning. Defendant initialed next to this right at
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Opinion of the Court
number 5 on the English rights form provided to him by
Detective Kelly to signify his understanding.
12. That Defendant initialed a space below the
enumerated rights on the English rights form that stated
the following: “I am 14 years old or more and I understand
my rights as explained by Detective Kelly. I DO wi[s]h to
answer questions now, WITHOUT a lawyer, parent,
guardian, or custodian here with me. My decision to
answer questions now is made freely and is my own choice.
No one has threatened me in any way or promised me
special treatment. Because I have decided to answer
questions now, I am signing my name below.”
13. That Defendant’s signature appears on the English
rights form below the initialed portions of the form.
Defendant’s signature appears next to the date, 1-9-13, and
the time, 12:10. Detective Kelly signed her name as a
witness below Defendant’s signature.
14. That after being informed of his rights, informing
Detective Kelly he wished to waive those rights, and
signing the rights form, Defendant communicated to
Detective Kelly that he wished to contact his mother by
phone. Defendant was given permission to do so.
15. That Defendant attempted to call his mother, but
was unable to speak to her.
16. That Defendant indicated that his mother was on
her lunch break at the time he tried to contact her.
17. That Defendant did not at that time or any other
time indicate that he changed his mind regarding his
desire to speak to Detective Kelly. That Defendant did not
at that time or any other time indicate that he revoked his
waiver.
18. That Defendant only asked to speak to his mother.
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Opinion of the Court
19. That Defendant did not make his interview
conditional on having his mother present or conditional on
speaking to his mother.
20. That Defendant did not ask to have his mother
present at the interview site.
21. That, upon review of the totality of the
circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant’s request to
speak to his mother was at best an ambiguous request to
speak to his mother.
22. That at no time did Defendant make an
unambiguous request to have his mother present during
questioning.
23. That Defendant never indicated that his mother was
on the way or could be present during questioning.
24. That Defendant made no request for a delay of
questioning.
Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter of law:
1. That the State carried its burden by a
preponderance of the evidence that Defendant knowingly,
willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights.
2. That the interview process in this case was
consistent with the interrogation procedures as set forth in
North Carolina General Statute § 7B-2101.
3. That none of Defendant’s State or Federal rights
were violated during the interview conducted of Defendant.
4. That statements made by Defendant were not
gathered as a result of any State or Federal rights
violation.
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Opinion of the Court
In light of these findings and conclusions, the trial court denied defendant’s
suppression motion.
On 4 June 2014, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to two counts of
felonious breaking or entering and two counts of conspiracy to commit breaking or
entering while reserving the right to seek appellate review of the denial of his
suppression motion.2 Based upon defendant’s plea, Judge Caldwell consolidated
defendant’s convictions for judgment and entered a judgment sentencing defendant
to a term of six to seventeen months imprisonment, with this sentence being
suspended and defendant placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six
months on the condition that defendant serve a forty-five day active sentence, for
which he received forty-five days’ credit for time spent in pretrial confinement; pay
the costs; comply with the usual terms and conditions of probation; and have no
contact with the victim.3 Defendant noted an appeal from Judge Caldwell’s judgment
to the Court of Appeals.
2 The plea agreement between defendant and the State provided that, in return for
defendant’s guilty pleas, the State would voluntarily dismiss one additional count of felonious
breaking or entering, one count of conspiracy to break or enter, and three counts of felonious
larceny and that defendant would receive a sentence of six to seventeen months
imprisonment, with this sentence to be suspended and with defendant to be on supervised
probation for a period of thirty-six months, with the terms and conditions of defendant’s
probation including a requirement that he serve a forty-five day split sentence, subject to
credit for time served in pretrial confinement, and that he be subject to intensive probation
for a period of one year.
3The final page of Judge Caldwell’s judgment was omitted from the record on appeal.
Having obtained a copy of that page from the office of the Clerk of Superior Court,
Mecklenburg County, we have added it to the record on appeal upon our own motion pursuant
to N.C.R. App. P. 9(b)(5)b.
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Opinion of the Court
In seeking relief from the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that his request
to call his mother during his conversation with Detective Kelly had constituted “an
unambiguous invocation of his right to have a parent present during a custodial
interrogation” and that, in the alternative, even if his request for the presence of his
mother had been ambiguous, “[Detective] Kelly was required to make further
inquiries to clarify whether he actually meant that he was invoking his right to end
the interrogation until his mother was present.” State v. Saldierna, 242 N.C. App.
347, 353,
775 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2015) (Saldierna I). In addition, defendant contended
that the trial court had failed to “appropriately consider his juvenile status in
determining that his waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary.”
Id. at 354,
775
S.E.2d at 331.
In holding that the trial court had erred by denying defendant’s suppression
motion, the Court of Appeals determined “that[, while] the findings of fact regarding
the ambiguous nature of [defendant’s] statement, ‘Can I call my mom[,]’ are
supported by competent evidence,” the “ambiguous [nature of that] statement
required [Detective] Kelly to clarify whether [defendant] was invoking his right to
have a parent present during the interview.” Id. at 360,
775 S.E.2d at 334. As a
result, the Court of Appeals held “that the trial court erred in concluding that
[Detective] Kelly complied with the provisions of section 7B-2101” and “reverse[d] the
trial court’s order, vacate[d] the judgments entered upon [defendant’s] guilty pleas,
and remand[ed] to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion to suppress.”
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Opinion of the Court
Id. at 360,
775 S.E.2d at 334. This Court granted the State’s petition seeking
discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision, reversed that decision, and
remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s remaining
challenge to the trial court’s suppression order. State v. Saldierna,
369 N.C. 401, 409,
794 S.E.2d 474, 479 (2016).4
In overturning the Court of Appeals’ decision in Saldierna I, this Court
concluded that defendant’s statement, “Um, [c]an I call my mom?”, did not constitute
“a clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to have his parent or guardian
present during questioning.” Id. at 408,
794 S.E.2d at 479 (citing Davis v. United
States,
512 U.S. 452, 459,
114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355,
129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371 (1994) (holding
that invocation of the right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that
can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
attorney”)). “Although defendant asked to call his mother, he never gave any
indication that he wanted to have her present for his interrogation, nor did he
condition his interview on first speaking with her.” Id. at 408,
794 S.E.2d at 479. As
a result, we determined that the Court of Appeals had erred by holding that the
ambiguous nature of defendant’s request to be allowed to call his mother required
4 Justice Beasley dissented from the Court’s decision to reverse the Court of Appeals
based upon her belief that the record established that defendant had unambiguously invoked
his right to the presence of a parent and that investigating officers had an obligation to obtain
clarification of any ambiguous statement that defendant may have made regarding the extent
to which he desired the presence of a parent prior to being interrogated by Detective Kelly.
Saldierna, 369 N.C. at 409,
794 S.E.2d at 479-80 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
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Opinion of the Court
Detective Kelly to make further inquiry into the extent to which defendant intended
to invoke his right to have his mother present before any custodial interrogation could
commence. Id. at 409,
794 S.E.2d at 479.
On remand before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court
had erred by denying his suppression motion on the grounds that his confession had
been obtained as the result of a violation of both his statutory and constitutional
rights as a juvenile. According to defendant, the United States Supreme Court held
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina “that reviewing courts must take into account the
juvenile’s age and maturity when determining the admissibility of a confession, and
not to evaluate the confession as if the juvenile were an adult,” citing J.D.B., 564 U.S.
261, 272,
131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403,
180 L. Ed. 2d 310, 323-24 (2011). Defendant argued
“that the Davis test should not be applied to the context of a juvenile interrogation”
because “Davis involved an adult,” because “the [United States] Supreme Court did
not announce that the rule applied equally to juvenile confessions,” and because “the
[United States] Supreme Court has made clear . . . that juvenile confessions should
be evaluated differently than adult confessions,” citing, inter alia, In re Gault,
387
U.S. 1,
87 S. Ct. 1428,
18 L. Ed. 257 (1967), and J.D.B.,
564 U.S. 261,
131 S. Ct. 2394,
180 L. Ed. 2d 310.
In addition, defendant argued that, in light of the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach outlined in J.D.B., the trial court had erred by failing to consider that
defendant “was in custody and outnumbered by three law enforcement officers”; had
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Opinion of the Court
“stated to the detective plainly, ‘[c]an I call my mom now?’ ”; was sixteen years old
and had only completed the eighth grade as of the date of the interrogation; “indicated
to [Detective Kelly] that his native language was Spanish, that he could not write in
English, and he may have stated he had difficulty understanding” Detective Kelly;
provided “unclear” responses to questions that Detective Kelly posed during the
interrogation; and expressed a desire to call his mother. According to defendant, an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s interrogation
established that the trial court had erred by finding that defendant had knowingly
and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights.
The State, on the other hand, argued before the Court of Appeals that
defendant had knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights
when he was advised of those rights in spoken English, written English, and written
Spanish; had acknowledged that he understood those rights; and had expressed, both
verbally and in writing, his willingness to waive those rights. “[A]s [ ] evidence of his
understanding and intention to proceed with the interview,” the State pointed to the
fact that defendant had “signed each paragraph of the Rights Waiver Form” and had
gone “on to answer Detective Kelly’s questions for nearly an hour without ever once
indicating . . . . he did not understand the rights read to him or that he was at all
unclear about the choice he made to answer questions.” Although “age is to be
considered by the trial judge,” the State asserted that defendant’s juvenile status and
grade level did not preclude him from understanding and waiving his juvenile rights.
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Moreover, the State claimed that “[t]here is no evidence of mistreatment or coercion”
during the interrogation. In spite of the fact that it involved the interrogation of an
adult rather than a juvenile, the State contended that the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Davis remains applicable in determining whether defendant had
validly waived his juvenile rights. Finally, the State argued that defendant’s reliance
upon J.D.B. was misplaced given that J.D.B. involved the issue of a juvenile’s age as
“relevant to the determination of whether the child was considered to have been ‘in
custody’ for Miranda purposes” and given that the United States Supreme Court had
stated in J.D.B. that “a child’s age will [not] be determinative, or even a significant
factor in every case,” quoting J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277,
131 S. Ct. at 2406,
180 L. Ed.
2d at 326.
In holding that the trial court had erred by denying defendant’s suppression
motion, the Court of Appeals concluded on remand that defendant did not “knowingly,
willingly, and understandingly waive[ ] his rights under section 7B-2101 of the North
Carolina General Statutes and under the constitutions of North Carolina and the
United States.” State v. Saldierna, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 803 S.E.2d 33, 35 (2017)
(Saldierna II). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals explained that,
“[w]hether a waiver is knowingly and intelligently made depends on the specific facts
and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused.”
Id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting State v. Simpson,
314 N.C. 359,
367,
334 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1985)). According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he totality of
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the circumstances must be carefully scrutinized when determining if a youthful
defendant has legitimately waived his Miranda rights,” id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 40
(quoting State v. Reid,
335 N.C. 647, 663,
440 S.E.2d 776, 785 (1994) (emphasis
added)), given that juveniles possess “unique vulnerabilities,” in that “(1) they are
less likely than adults to understand their rights; and (2) they are distinctly
susceptible to police interrogation techniques,”
id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 42 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Cara A. Gardner, Failing to Serve and Protect: A Proposal for an
Amendment to a Juvenile’s Right to a Parent, Guardian, or Custodian During a Police
Interrogation After State v. Oglesby,
86 N.C. L. Rev. 1685, 1698 (2008)).
The Court of Appeals stated that, “despite the trial court’s many findings of
fact that defendant ‘indicated he understood’ Detective Kelly’s questions and
statements regarding his rights, the evidence as recorded contemporaneously during
the questioning and as noted in testimony from the hearing, does not support those
findings.” Id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 41. In addition, the Court of Appeals stated that
“the findings do not reflect the scrutiny that a trial court is required to give in juvenile
cases.”
Id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 41. Among other things, the Court of Appeals noted
that “no response [was] recorded that [defendant] ‘understood’ ” that Detective Kelly
had asked defendant to initial, sign, and date the English version of the juvenile
rights waiver form.
Id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 41. For that reason, the Court of Appeals
held that the finding of fact “ ‘[t]hat [d]efendant was advised of his juvenile rights . . .
in written Spanish,’ is not supported by competent documentary evidence in the
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record” and that “the evidence does not support the trial court’s ultimate conclusion
that defendant executed a valid waiver.” Id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 41 (alterations in
original). As a result, the Court of Appeals determined that “the totality of the
circumstances set forth in this record ultimately do not fully support the trial court’s
conclusions of law, namely, ‘[t]hat the State carried its burden by a preponderance of
the evidence that [d]efendant knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his
juvenile rights.’ ”
Id. at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 43 (alterations in original). This Court
granted the State’s petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ remand
decision in Saldierna II on 1 November 2017.
In seeking to persuade us to reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision, the State
claims that the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the applicable standard of
appellate review. According to the State, the Court of Appeals should have focused
upon determining “whether the unchallenged findings of fact supported the trial
court’s conclusion of law that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
juvenile rights.” The State further contends that, even if the trial court’s findings
had been challenged by defendant as lacking in sufficient evidentiary support, they
would nevertheless be “conclusive on appeal” because they were “supported by
competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting,” quoting State v. Eason, 336
N.C. 730, 745,
445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1096,
115 S. Ct. 764,
130 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1995). In the State’s view, the audio recording of defendant’s
interview with Detective Kelly “demonstrates that defendant had the ability to
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Opinion of the Court
understand Detective Kelly as she read him his juvenile rights.” In addition, the
State notes that, in instances in which defendant failed to provide an audible
response to Detective Kelly’s inquiries concerning the extent to which defendant
understood specific juvenile rights, defendant placed his initials by the relevant
paragraph on the juvenile rights waiver form. Finally, the State asserts that
Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony sufficed to support the trial court’s
findings to the effect that defendant understood Detective Kelly as she read his
juvenile rights to him.
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the State failed to meet its burden
of demonstrating that he knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his
statutory and constitutional rights. According to defendant, this Court should
consider defendant’s youth, his request to call his mother, the number of officers
present during the interrogation, and the misleading statements made to defendant
by investigating officers in determining that the trial court had erred by denying
defendant’s suppression motion. In spite of the fact that defendant had initialed the
juvenile rights waiver form, defendant argues that the fact that his responses to
Detective Kelly’s questions regarding the extent to which he understood his rights
were unclear indicates that he had not understood the questions that Detective Kelly
had posed to him. In addition, defendant notes that the trial court failed to make any
findings of fact concerning defendant’s “experience, education, background, . . .
intelligence,” and “capacity to understand the warnings given [to] him” as required
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
by the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis enunciated in Fare v. Michael C.,
quoting Fare, 442 U.S. 707, 725,
99 S. Ct. 2560, 2571,
61 L. Ed. 2d 197, 212 (1979).
In light of these deficiencies in the trial court’s findings of fact and the fact that, in
the Court of Appeals’ view, the relevant findings were actually mixed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, defendant contends that the Court of Appeals appropriately
examined the evidence anew, citing, inter alia, Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business
Systems, Inc.,
319 N.C. 534, 548,
356 S.E.2d 578, 586-87 (1987), and had not
committed any error of law in the course of overturning the trial court’s suppression
order.
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is
whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-
68,
712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citation omitted). The trial court’s findings of fact
“are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting.” Eason,
336 N.C. at 745,
445 S.E.2d at 926. “The conclusions of law made
by the trial court from such findings, however, are fully reviewable on appeal.” State
v. McCollum,
334 N.C. 208, 237,
433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (1993) (citation omitted), cert.
denied,
512 U.S. 1254,
114 S. Ct. 2784,
129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994), post-conviction relief
granted, State v. McCollum, No. 83 CRS 15506-07,
2014 WL 4345428 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Robeson County Sept. 2, 2014) (order vacating defendant’s convictions and the
trial court’s judgment, and mandating defendant’s immediate release from custody).
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
“[A]n appellate court accords great deference to the trial court . . . because it is
entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh and resolve any conflicts in the
evidence, find the facts, and, then based upon those findings, render a legal decision,
in the first instance, as to whether or not a constitutional violation of some kind has
occurred.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134,
291 S.E.2d 618, 619-20 (1982).
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) states that
(a) [a]ny juvenile in custody must be advised
prior to questioning:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement the juvenile does make
can be and may be used against the juvenile;
(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent,
guardian, or custodian present during
questioning; and
(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with
an attorney and that one will be appointed for
the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented
and wants representation.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) (2015).5 The relevant statutory language is clearly intended
to codify the rights afforded to a juvenile subjected to custodial interrogation
5 At the time that the interrogation at issue in this case occurred, N.C.G.S. § 7B-
2101(b) provided that, “[w]hen the juvenile is less than 14 years of age, no in-custody
admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless
the confession or admission was made in the presence of the juvenile’s parent, guardian,
custodian, or attorney.” For offenses committed on or after 1 December 2015, the General
Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(b) by raising the age at which the presence of the
juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney is required from less than fourteen to less
than sixteen. Act of May 26, 2015, ch. 58, secs. 1.1, 4. 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126, 130.
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
pursuant to Miranda in addition to affording a juvenile the State statutory right to
have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during the interrogation process. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444,
86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706-07
(1966) (holding that, “[p]rior to any questioning, [a] person [subjected to custodial
interrogation] must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed,” although “[t]he
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”). “If the juvenile indicates in any manner
and at any stage of questioning pursuant to this section that the juvenile does not
wish to be questioned further, the officer shall cease questioning.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
2101(c). “Before admitting into evidence any statement resulting from custodial
interrogation, the court shall find that the juvenile knowingly, willingly, and
understandingly waived the juvenile’s rights.” Id. § 7B-2101(d) (2017). The State
“bears the burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently
made, and an express written waiver, while strong proof of the validity of the waiver,
is not inevitably sufficient to establish a valid waiver.” Simpson,
314 N.C. at 367,
334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted); see also State v. Thibodeaux,
341 N.C. 53, 58,
However, given that defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the interrogation at issue
in this case, neither version of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(b) would have barred the admission of
defendant’s incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the unlawful break-ins
at the residence of Ms. Brewer and Mr. Nunez.
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
459 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1995) (explaining that “[t]he State has the burden of showing by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary”). “Whether a waiver is
knowingly and intelligently made depends on the specific facts and circumstances of
each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”
Simpson,
314 N.C. at 367,
334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted). As a result, “the court
[is required to look] at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement”
in order to determine whether the State has adequately established that a waiver
was knowingly and intelligently made. Thibodeaux,
341 N.C. at 58,
459 S.E.2d at
505.
“This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether
there was been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.” Fare, 442
U.S. at 725,
99 S. Ct. at 2572,
61 L. Ed. 2d at 212. “The totality approach permits—
indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation,” including “evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his . . . rights, and the consequences of waiving
those rights.”
Id. at 725,
99 S. Ct. at 2572,
61 L. Ed. 2d at 212 (citing North Carolina
v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369,
99 S. Ct. 1755,
60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979)). In applying the
totality-of-the-circumstances test in cases involving the custodial interrogation of
juveniles, we have noted that “the record must be carefully scrutinized, with
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
particular attention to both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 19,
305 S.E.2d 685, 697 (1983) (quoting
State v. Spence,
36 N.C. App. 627, 629,
244 S.E.2d 442, 443, disc. rev. denied,
295 N.C.
556,
248 S.E.2d 734 (1978)). However, a defendant’s juvenile status “does not compel
a determination that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda
rights.” Id. at 19,
305 S.E.2d at 696-97 (citation omitted). Instead, the juvenile’s age
is a factor to consider along with “the characteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation.”
Id. at 19,
305 S.E.2d at 697 (quoting Spence,
309 N.C. at 629,
244
S.E.2d at 443).
A careful review of the record satisfies us that the trial court’s findings of fact
have adequate evidentiary support and that those findings support the trial court’s
conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile rights. In
reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals failed to focus upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact that the trial court actually
made and to give proper deference to those findings. Cooke, 306 N.C. at 134,
291
S.E.2d at 619-20. Although the Court of Appeals concluded that “the evidence does
not support the trial court’s findings of fact . . . that defendant ‘understood’ Detective
Kelly’s questions and statements regarding his rights,” Saldierna II, ___ N.C. App.
at ___,
803 S.E.2d at 41, the record contains ample support for the trial court’s
determination that defendant understood his juvenile rights, with this determination
resting upon the existence of evidence tending to show that Detective Kelly advised
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
defendant of his juvenile rights in spoken English, written Spanish, and written
English;6 that defendant initialed each of the rights enumerated on the juvenile
rights waiver form that Detective Kelly reviewed with him and signed the juvenile
rights waiver form in such a manner as to indicate that he had decided to waive his
juvenile rights and to speak with Detective Kelly without the presence of a parent,
guardian, custodian, or attorney; that defendant answered affirmatively when
questioned about the extent to which he understood his rights; and that defendant
“understood what [Detective Kelly] was saying.” As a result, we hold that the Court
of Appeals erred in determining that the record did not support the trial court’s
findings to the effect that defendant understood his juvenile rights.
Admittedly, the record does contain evidence that would have supported a
different determination concerning the issue of whether defendant understood the
juvenile rights that were available to him. For example, the record does reflect that
some of defendant’s responses to Detective Kelly’s inquiries concerning the extent to
which he understood certain of his rights were “unintelligible” and that English was
not defendant’s primary language. However, given the evidence recited above,
including Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony that defendant “seemed to
very clearly understand what [she] was asking him” and that his English was “fine,”
6 In spite of the fact that the record does not contain the Spanish language version of
the juvenile rights waiver form, the trial court’s determination that defendant was informed
of his juvenile rights in written form using the Spanish language is amply supported by
Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony.
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
the record concerning the extent to which defendant was able to understand the
English language in general and Detective Kelly’s questions in particular was, at
most, in conflict. According to well-established North Carolina law, resolution of such
evidentiary conflicts is a matter for the trial court, which has the opportunity to see
and hear the witnesses, rather than an appellate court, which is necessarily limited
to consideration of a cold record even in cases involving audio recordings and
videographic evidence.
In addition, the trial court’s findings support its conclusion of law that
“[d]efendant knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights.”
Among other things, the record contains defendant’s express written waiver of his
juvenile rights which, while not determinative, is “strong proof of the validity of the
waiver.” Simpson, 314 N.C. at 367,
334 S.E.2d at 59. In addition to the express
written waiver, the record contains evidence tending to show, and the trial court
found, that defendant was advised of his rights in both written English and Spanish
and in spoken English. Moreover, the transcript of defendant’s interview with
Detective Kelly indicates that, in all but two instances, defendant verbally affirmed
that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer Detective Kelly’s
questions. Aside from the fact that defendant’s suggestion that the inaudibility of
certain of defendant’s responses demonstrated that he did not understand his rights
conflicts with Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony to the contrary and
the fact that the record contains no evidence tending to show that defendant ever
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
expressed a lack of willingness to speak with Detective Kelly, sought to invoke his
rights, or was unable to adequately communicate with the investigating officers, this
aspect of defendant’s argument represents, in essence, an attempt to persuade us to
reweigh the evidence and reach a different result with respect to a factual issue other
than that deemed appropriate by the trial court. Similarly, the Court of Appeals’
determinations that defendant’s request to call his mother “shows enough
uncertainty, enough anxiety on [defendant’s] behalf, so as to call into question
whether, under all the circumstances present in this case, the waiver was
(unequivocally) valid” and that defendant’s “last ditch effort to call his mother (for
help), after his prior attempt to call her had been unsuccessful,[7] was a strong
indication that he did not want to waive his rights at all,” Saldierna II, ___ N.C. App.
at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 42, are inconsistent with the trial court’s findings of fact
concerning the circumstances surrounding defendant’s attempt to call his mother,
which we have already found to have adequate record support. Finally, the record
contains no allegations of coercive police conduct or the use of improper interrogation
techniques.8 As a result, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that
7 A number of statements that were made by investigating officers during Detective
Kelly’s interview with defendant suggest that defendant had made an earlier, unsuccessful
attempt to reach his mother before the phone call reflected in the interview transcript.
8 Both defendant and the Court of Appeals appear to assert that Detective Kelly’s
statement to defendant that “[t]his is not something that’s going to end your life” and “is not
a huge deal” constituted a deceptive statement that should be weighed in favor of a finding
that defendant had not voluntarily waived his juvenile rights. We are acutely aware that the
incurrence of a felony conviction can have significant, and lasting, effects upon a juvenile’s
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Opinion of the Court
defendant had knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights
and that the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary should be reversed.9
REVERSED.
prospects. However, we are not persuaded that the statement in question constitutes official
misconduct sufficient to compel a conclusion that defendant’s will was overborne at the time
that he decided to waive his juvenile rights and speak with Detective Kelly and believe that
it simply reflects Detective Kelly’s opinion that defendant was not suspected of having
committed other, more serious criminal offenses.
9 A considerable amount of defendant’s argument to this Court focuses upon policy,
rather than legal or evidentiary, considerations. Although defendant points to a substantial
body of research that suggests that juveniles are unable to understand the language typically
used in informing them of their rights, the approach that defendant advocates in reliance
upon this information lacks support in the precedent of the United States Supreme Court or
of this Court. On the contrary, as we have already noted, the United States Supreme Court
has explicitly held that the totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining the validity of
waivers of a defendant’s Miranda rights is equally applicable to adults and juveniles, see
Fare, 442 U.S. at 725,
99 S. Ct. at 2572,
61 L. Ed. 2d at 212, with a juvenile’s age being a
relevant, but not determinative, factor in the required analysis. Nothing in the record that
has been presented for our consideration tends to show that the trial court failed to properly
incorporate evidence concerning defendant’s age or his linguistic and educational status into
the required totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation.
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STATE V. SALDIERNA
Beasley, J., dissenting
Justice BEASLEY dissenting.
In Saldierna I, I dissented because defendant’s statement, “Um, [c]an I call my
mom?”, was an unambiguous invocation of his right to have a parent present during
questioning. See State v. Saldierna (Saldierna I), 369 N.C. 401, 409,
794 S.E.2d 474,
479 (2016) (Beasley, J., dissenting). Upon this unambiguous invocation, law
enforcement should have immediately ceased questioning and not resumed until
defendant’s mother was present or he reinitiated the conversation. See
id. at 412,
794 S.E.2d at 481 (citing Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484-85,
68 L. Ed. 2d 378,
386 (1981)). Defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
right to have his mother present—rather, he unambiguously invoked that right.
Thus, for the reasons stated in my dissent to Saldierna I, I respectfully dissent.
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