Stephenson v. Riddle’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We think the controlling question is whether KRS 119.020(3) authorized the designation of Keesee to fill the vacancy in the Republican nomination. The statute says: Tf a vacancy occurs in a nomination made by primary, after the primary and before the ballots are printed for the regular election, the governing authority of the party may provide for filling the vacancy. * * * ’ “The statute does not, in terms, exclude anyone, by reason of lack of party membership or otherwise, from being named to fill a vacancy in a nomination. However, in Francis v. Sturgill, 163 Ky. 650 , 174 S.W. 753 , it was held that this statute must be construed in the light of the basic purposes and objects of the primary election law, and as so construed the statute did not permit a vacancy in a nomination to be filled by a person who had been a candidate at the primary for a nomination by the other party. “Keesee maintains that the reasoning of the Sturgill case is not applicable to a judicial office, because under KRS 119.-070 a person may seek and receive a party nomination without his being a member or adherent of that party, and even though he is an avowed supporter of the other party. In our opinion, however, there is more reason to apply the Sturgill reasoning to a judicial office. The plain purpose of the nonpartisan (or bipartisan) judicial nomination statute, KRS 119.070, is to minimize partisan political influences in judicial elections. To permit a defeated candidate for one party’s nomina”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McDonald v. Revell