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← 372 F.3d 784 - Geier v. Sundquist

Geier v. Sundquist’s Empirical Analysis

372 F.3d 784 · 2004

Citation profile

61
cited by 61 later decisions
January 2021
most recently cited

19 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 61 later decisions — most recently January 2021 · most notably Garner v. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court (2009), United States v. Collins (2015)

19 federal appellate ·

330200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Relies on Hensley v. Eckerhart · Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society · Blum v. Stenson · Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. · Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the question; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[T]he [common fund] doctrine is inappropriate here because there is simply no fund. The benefit provided to the plaintiff class—the desegregation of Tennessee’s system of higher education—is not pecuniary in any conventional way and did not result in the creation of a fund to be divided up among the plaintiffs, as is the case in common fund cases. Although ... the benefits attained could perhaps be measured as pecuniary—in the sense that a dollar value could be assigned to the cost of the remedial measures-transposing the action’s social value into monetary value is imprecise, and more importantly, still leaves us without a fund. The money designated by Tennessee for the remedial programs goes to fund the programs, not to pay plaintiffs.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “is that rate which lawyers of comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the venue of the court of record, rather than foreign counsel’s typical charge for work performed within a geographical area wherein he maintains his office and/or normally practices, at least where the lawyer’s reasonable “home” rate exceeds the reasonable “local” charge.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.