372 F. Supp. 2d 465 - McLaughlin v. Murphy’s Empirical Analysis
2004
Citation profile
7 district · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1746 · 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 29 U.S.C. § 213
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Conley v. Gibson · Scheuer v. Rhodes · Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co. · International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In contrast to Medex, the employment contract between McLaughlin and Freedmont does not condition payment of commissions on an employee’s continued employment. Rather, it conditions payment on the closing of the loan. It is not contrary to public policy for Freedmont to decide that commissions will only be paid for those loans that are fully settled. Closing a loan is set forth in the contract as a key element of the broker’s job, and the brokerage fees from settled loans are likely crucial to Freedmont’s income. Unlike Medex, in this case compensation is not linked to an arbitrary factor such as employment on a particular date, but to a reasonable job requirement. The fact that it might take more effort to find clients than to close a loan does not make the employment contract illogical or contrary to the policy of the MWPCL. If McLaughlin’s job were simply to find loan clients and start the process, then Freedmont would have to pay him for his efforts. See Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 540-51 [ 745 A.2d 1026 ] (2000)(employ-ee whose sole job was to generate and develop loans was entitled to commissions for loans he completely developed that closed after his resignation). But the contract makes clear that his job was to prospect, develop, and settle loans completely, and that he would be paid when those duties were performed. Under the MWPCL, only when McLaughlin completed all those tasks would his right to any payment vest. Because McLaughlin did not do eve”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The MWPCL limits the availability of treble damages, however, to violations of § 3-502 or § 3-505. Section 3-502 deals with the timing of payment, and Section 3-505 deals with payment on cessation of employment. In contrast, McLaughlin’s minimum wage and overtime claims are based on his entitlement to the wages themselves. He does not allege that Freedmont failed to pay him regularly, but that it failed to pay him enough; and he does not allege that Freedmont failed to pay him minimum wage and overtime due him upon his termination, but that it failed to pay him these wages at all.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, each employer shall pay an employee or the authorized representative of an employee all wages due for work that the employee performed before the termination of employment, on or before the day on which the employee would have been paid the wages if the employment had not been terminated.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.