¶1concurring. I believe we should take this opportunity to clarify our prior case law interpreting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). In Davis, the Court stated that it was unwilling to extend the protection afforded by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which requires that law enforcement immediately cease questioning upon a suspect’s clear assertion of the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. The Davis court refused to require yet another layer of protection that would prevent continued interrogation when the accused might want a lawyer. Davis, 512 U.S. 452. Thus, it declined to extend Edwards to require that police cease questioning when the accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for the assistance of counsel. Id.
¶2The Court’s opinion in Davis makes clear that the standard of unequivocality is applicable only after the accused initially waives his or her rights and begins to make a statement:
A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. Although Edwards provides an additional protection — if a suspect subsequently requests an attorney, questioning must cease — it is one that must be affirmatively invoked by the suspect.
¶3Id. at 460-61. The Court held that, “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461.
¶4As noted by the majority, Robinson never waived his rights. Thus, his statement, “I don’t want to say anything right now,” was not required by Davis to be unequivocal. Rather, it was sufficient because it was made “in any manner.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.5 (2007); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
¶5Our prior case law seems to suggest a requirement of unequivocality even before a defendant waives his Miranda rights. In order to differentiate the standard applicable to the invocation of rights before waiver from the standard applicable when the defendant invokes his rights after waiver, it is necessary to review our decision in Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1995). In Bowen, the accused was read his Miranda rights but made no indication that he understood or waived those rights. Id. The accused declined to sign a waiver-of-rights form, saying he “wanted to think about” whether to waive his rights and make a statement. Id. at 502, 911 S.W.2d at 564. However, the sheriff continued to question him, and the accused ultimately gave an inculpatory statement. Id. We held that the accused waived his rights by implication, as he continued to answer questions even after acknowledging his rights. Id. (citing Bryant v. State, 314 Ark. 130, 862 S.W.2d 215 (1993); Ward v. State, 308 Ark. 415, 827 S.W.2d 110 (1992); Duncan v. State, 291 Ark. 521, 726 S.W.2d 653 (1987)).
¶6We also suggested that the accused’s initial invocation was not sufficiently specific under Davis: “Our view of this matter is that, by saying he wanted to ‘think about’ waiver, Mr. Bowen indicated an understanding of what was at stake. We do not regard the statement as an invocation of his rights, however. In a recent case, the Supreme Court has held that the invocation of the right to counsel-must be made with specificity, [citing Davis.]” Bowen, 322 Ark. at 504, 911 S.W.2d at 565. I disagree with this characterization of Davis, because Davis does not mandate an unequivocal invocation before a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights. Davis, 512 U.S. 452. Nonetheless, Bowen is distinguishable on its facts. We stated in Bowen that the relevant question was not whether the accused’s statement that he wanted to “think about” waiver amounted to an invocation of his right to remain silent, but “whether a subsequent statement may imply waiver.” Bowen, 322 Ark. at 503, 911 S.W.2d at 565. Thus, we disposed of Bowen by dealing with waiver, whereas we approach the case at bar as a question of invocation. The majority is correct in refusing to extend the standard of unequivocality beyond the parameters set forth in Davis.
¶7dissenting. Our review of this appeal centers on one issue — whether the circuit court erred in refusing to suppress Robinson’s statement to the State Police. From my review of the relevant law, facts, and circumstances, I conclude the circuit court was clearly right, and I would affirm.
¶8As set out in the majority opinion, the relevant facts reflect that Robinson shot and killed Brian Wilbanks. Robinson then fled the scene in his vehicle; the flight escalated into a chase by law enforcement officers, and the chase ended when Robinson’s car ran into a police car. Robinson then left his vehicle and fled on foot with Sheriff Brent Earley in pursuit. Upon catching Robinson, Earley read Robinson his rights, which he said he understood. Earley asked, “why are you running from the police?” Robinson replied, “I don’t want to say anything right now.” Earley then took Robinson down the hill where he asked him why he would “shoot somebody over a woman,” to which Robinson said, “this goes back a lot further than what you understand.” Afterward, Earley turned Robinson over to other officers and left to search for additional evidence. At that point in time, Robinson was placed in the passenger seat of a patrol vehicle, whereupon Special Agent Wendell Jines confirmed that Robinson had been read his rights by Sheriff Earley and understood them. Jines then began taping his interrogation of Robinson, and Robinson never requested an attorney or attempted to end the interrogation. Robinson, however, disagrees with this, arguing he did assert his right to remain silent.
¶9Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that when a defendant is subject to custodial interrogation and indicates in any manner that he does riot wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. Our court adopted the Miranda rule verbatim on January 1, 1976. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.5. Citing Davis v. United States, 351 U.S. 452 (1994), as authority, our court later held that the invocation of the right to counsel or to remain silent must be made with specificity, and that there was no distinction between the invocation of the right to counsel and the invocation of the right to remain silent with respect to the manner in which it must be effected. See Standridge v. State, 329 Ark 473, 951 S.W.2d 299 (1997); Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 299 (1995).
¶10In sum, under Standridge and Bowen, the defendant is required to invoke his right to remain silent with specificity, and the defendant’s request must not be ambiguous or equivocal. Moreover, this court has repeatedly held that one may waive one’s right to remain silent by implication by merely answering questions. Bowen, supra; see also Standridge. In Davis, the Court addressed the invocation-of-the-right-to-counsel issue and further held that a request is ambiguous or equivocal if a reasonable officer, in light of the circumstances, would have understood that the suspect was only tentative in invoking his right to remain silent but might later change his mind.
¶11Here, despite Robinson’s first statement that he did not want to talk “right now,” Robinson nonetheless answered Sheriff Earley’s second question about “why would you shoot a man over a woman?” Robinson replied, “This goes back a lot further than what you understand.” Special Agent Jines then took custody of Robinson and had Robinson confirm that he had been given his rights. When Jines asked if he understood them, Robinson first said, “No” but added, “Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I have.” After Robinson acknowledged he understood his rights, Jines continued his questioning, and Robinson gave a statement. When a reasonable person considers Robinson’s remarks to Earley and his statements given to Jines, it becomes clear that Robinson wanted to talk and his intention to do so began with his statements to Earley and subsequently he went “full blown” when Jines interviewed Robinson. Given the banter between Robinson and Jines, I submit that Robinson fully intended to talk further, despite his earlier statement that he did not want to say anything “right now.”
¶12In the present case, Robinson’s attempted invocation of his right to remain silent was equivocal because he merely said that he did not want to say anything “right now.” Robinson’s response could reasonably be interpreted to mean that he might (or would) talk later, and he did. Therefore, I would hold that the circuit court did not err in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police.