Wallace v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Supreme Court has subsequently articulated the Rakas two-step analysis as follows: “[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has 'a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.' ” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 , 119 S.Ct. 469, 472 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373, 379 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 -44 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430-31 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401 -02 n. 12). See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 36 (1988) (stating that “An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable'’).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Whiting v. State

2. “[T]his Court’s long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.... fB]y frankly recognizing that this aspect of the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing, we think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical footing.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Whiting v. State

3. “When the property is taken from the arrestee, the Fourth Amendment intrusion is a fait accompli. When, hours later, a crime lab technician picks up a gun from a storage locker to check it out ballistically, that is not a fresh Fourth Amendment intrusion requiring either a fresh exigency or a warrant for its justification. The danger of destruction is at an end once an arrestee’s property has been seized. That is the seizure, and the only seizure, that has Fourth Amendment significance. The property may then be dusted for fingerprints, examined for bloodstains or DNA, checked for serial numbers, or otherwise processed on a more leisurely basis as an investigation unfolds. Every time that an item, already in police hands, is physically picked up and examined or reexamined, that is not a fresh Fourth Amendment intrusion requiring a fresh justification.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 198 Md. App. 1 - Fair v. State