Coleman v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
15 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently June 2003
15 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Burks v. United States · Brown v. Ohio · Greene v. Massey · Crist v. Bretz · Jeffers v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"Having determined that appellant's conviction cannot stand, we must further decide whether or not the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) bars a subsequent prosecution on the lesser included offenses of simple assault or assault and battery. "An indictment charging assault with intent to murder also embraces the lesser offenses of simple assault and assault and battery. Wilson v. State, 53 Ala. App. 653 , 303 So.2d 153 (1974); Simpson [ v. State ], [ 59 Ala. 1 (1877)], at 9. A judgment of conviction is a bar to further prosecution that was or could have been embraced within the charge upon which the conviction was laid. Nunley v. United States, 339 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.1964); United States v. Henry, 504 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir.1974). Furthermore, in Gray v. United States, 14 F.2d 366, 368 (8th Cir. 1926), it was stated: "`... although a single act may constitute separate offenses, only one prosecution may be sustained, for the reason that the lesser offense is merged into the greater.' See also: Miller v. United States, 300 F. 529 (6th Cir.1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 624 , 45 S.Ct. 123 , 69 L.Ed. 474 (1924); United States v. Olmstead, 5 F.2d 712 (W.D.Wash.1925); Wharton's Criminal Procedure, § 580 (12th ed. 1976). "In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 51 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), the rule was reaffirmed that one convicted of a greater offense may not be prosecuted subseq”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“"In Simpson v. State , 59 Ala. 1 (1877) discussing the crime of assault with intent to murder, 1 the Supreme Court stated: `. . . The offense charged must be proved, and an essential element of the present offense is not only an assault with intent to murder, but the specific intent to murder Ford, the person named in the indictment. If the intent *Page 148 was to murder another, or if there was not the specific intent to murder Ford, there can not be a conviction of the aggravated offense charged, though there may be of the minor offense of assault or of assault and battery. . . .' (Citations omitted.) `Furthermore, at 12, the Court said: `. . . The true principal is, that the particular intent, the intent to murder the person assailed is [a] matter of fact, about which the law raises no presumptions, and indulges no inferences . . .' (Citations omitted.) `Simply put, the doctrine of transferred intent has no application to the offense of assault with intent to murder. Consequently, a general felonious intent, by implication of law, which will convert the killing of a human being into murder though his death was not the intent of the perpetrator has no application to the instant offense. The Supreme Court stated in Simpson , supra, at 18: `. . . It is excluded by the terms of the statute, which include only direct assaults on the person of the party it is averred there was the intent to murder. If in fact there was not the intent to murder him, whether there was a general fe”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“An indictment charging assault with intent to murder also embraces the lesser offenses of simple assault and assault and battery. Wilson v. State, 53 Ala. App. 653 , 303 So.2d 153 (1974); Simpson [ v. State ], [ 59 Ala. 1 (1877)], at 9. A judgment of conviction is a bar to further prosecution that was or could have been embraced within the charge upon which the conviction was laid. Nunley v. United States, 339 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.1964); United States v. Henry, 504 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir.1974). Furthermore, in Gray v. United States, 14 F.2d 366, 368 (8th Cir. 1926), it was stated:”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Ex Parte Beverly
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.