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← 373 U.S. 683 - Goss v. Board of Education of City of Knoxville Tennessee

Goss v. Board of Education of City of Knoxville Tennessee’s Empirical Analysis

1963

Citation profile

447
cited by 447 later decisions
46
cited 46 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
April 2001
most recently cited

225 federal appellate · 18 district · 9 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 447 later decisions (46 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2001 · most notably Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978), Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney (1979)

225 federal appellate · 18 district · 9 state decisions

309019631970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedGoss v. Board of Education of Knoxville (from Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. · Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority · Shelley v. Kraemer · Brown v. Board of Education · Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 447 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““It is readily apparent that the transfer system proposed lends itself to perpetuation of segregation. Indeed, the provisions can work only toward that end. * * * “Classifications based on race for purposes of transfers between public schools, as here, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * The recognition of race as an absolute criterion for granting transfers which operate only in the direction of schools in which the transferee’s race is in the majority is no less unconstitutional than its use for original admission or subsequent assignment to public schools. * * * “ * * * The transfer provisions here cannot be deemed to be reasonably designed to meet legitimate local problems, and therefore do not meet the requirements of Brown.” Id. 373 U.S. at 686-689 , 83 S.Ct. at 1407-1409 , 10 L.Ed.2d 632 .”
    11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““This is not to say that appropriate transfer provisions, upon the parents’ request, consistent with sound school administration and not based upon any state-imposed racial conditions, would fall. Likewise, we would have a different case here if the transfer provisions were unrestricted, allowing transfers to or from any school regardless of the race of the majority therein. But no official transfer plan or provision of which racial segregation is the inevitable consequence may stand under the Fourteenth Amendment.” pp. 688, 689, 83 S.Ct. p. 1409.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “the context in which we must interpret and apply this language [of Brown II] to plans for desegregation has been significantly altered.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.