Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 374 F.2d 583 - Marano v. United States

Marano v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

374 F.2d 583 · 1967

Citation profile

112
cited by 112 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
14
states following
February 2007
most recently cited

79 federal appellate · 7 district · 18 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 112 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2007 · most notably North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), Michigan v. Payne (1973)

79 federal appellate · 7 district · 18 state decisions — followed in 14 states

62019671970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Green v. United States · California v. Curry · United States v. Wiley · Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance · Worcester v. Commissioner

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 112 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““As we have recently held, a defendant’s right of appeal must be unfettered. Worcester v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 Cir., 1966, 370 F.2d 713 . So far as sentence is concerned, this principle cannot be restricted to those situations in which a defendant, in deciding whether to appeal, must contemplate the certainty of an increased sentence if he obtains a new trial and is convicted again. Not only must he not be faced with such certainty, Worcester v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, he likewise should not have to fear even the possibility that his exercise of his right to appeal will result in the imposition of a direct penalty for so doing. Accord, Patton v. State of North Carolina, W.D.N.Car., 1966, 256 F. Supp. 225 , 80 Harv.L.Rev. 891. But cf. Hayes v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 249 F.2d 516, 517 , cert. den. 356 U.S. 914 , 78 S.Ct. 672 , 2 L.Ed.2d 586 . But, equally, the judge should not be permitted to change his mind by deciding that he had been too lenient the first time, as was suggested here during oral argument, or, if a new judge, by having a different approach towards sentencing. We do not approve the contrary decision in Shear v. Boles, N.D.W.Va., 2/3/67, 263 F. Supp. 855 , cited to us by the government. Such possibilities, if they had to be recognized, might well be substantial deterrents to a decision to appeal.” [Footnotes omitted.]”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “the exceptional situation, where it is evident that the district court has given substantial consideration to legally impermissible factors,”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““The danger that the government may succeed in obtaining more damaging evidence on a retrial is just as real as the danger, for example, that the judge on his own may wish to reconsider, unfavorably to the defendant, the factors which led to his original disposition. We think that there must be repose not merely as to the severity of the court’s view, but as to the severity of the crime.” 12a”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.