United States of America, for the Use of R. F. Hudson v. Peerless Insurance Company, United States of America, for the Use of R. M. Bartenstein, John H. Bartenstein, and Michael H. Kelly, T/a R. M. Bartenstein & Associates v. Peerless Insurance Company’s Empirical Analysis
1967
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 3 district · 12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably Equipment Finance Group, Incorporated v. Traverse Computer Brokers, and Synchronized Design and Development Company, Incorporated (1992), Lang v. Catterton (1972)
9 federal appellate · 3 district · 12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. MacKey · Frow v. De La Vega · United States of America, for the Use and Benefit Of, Statham Instruments, Inc. v. Western Casualty & Surety Company · Kaufman & Ruderman, Inc. v. Cohn & Rosenberger
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Although Froto was a case of joint liability, we think the procedure established for multiple defendants by Rule 54(b) is strikingly similar and applicable not only to situations of joint liability but to those where the liability is joint and/or several.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Frow stands for the narrow rule that a default judgment may not be entered against one of several defendants ... when the nature of the relief demanded is such that, in order to be effective, it must be granted against each and every defendant.... The Frow rule seeks to prevent inconsistent judgments in cases involving joint liability or joint remedies. Some courts have interpreted Frow more broadly to apply when defendants are 'similarly situated,' even if not jointly liable. Thus, when defendants are 'similarly situated[,]' judgment should not be entered against a defaulting defendant if the other defendant prevails on the merits.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties [Id. (emphasis supplied).]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Hudson v. Ashley
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.