Freeman v. Fahey’s Empirical Analysis
374 F.3d 663 · 2004
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently November 2023
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000D · 42 U.S.C. § 5309
Relies on Cannon v. University of Chicago · Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington · Alexander v. Sandoval · Gonzaga University v. Doe · Barnes in Her Official Capacity As Member of the Board of Police Commissioners of Kansas City Missouri et al. v. Gorman
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We conclude the statute does not evince Congress’s intent to provide a private remedy. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 , 122 S.Ct. 2268 , 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) (even when statute contains rights-creating language, a plaintiff must still show “the statute manifests an intent ‘to create not just a private right but also a private remedy’ ”) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001)). Rather, section 5309 provides for administrative enforcement of the anti-discrimination provisions by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and for judicial enforcement through a civil action by the Attorney General, suggesting Congress intended to place enforcement in the hands of the Secretary, rather than private parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (b), (c); Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 (express provision of one means of enforcing substantive rule suggests Congress intended to preclude other means of enforcement; suggestion may be so strong as to overcome other language in statute that could support finding a private right of action).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In construing [the statute], we ask “whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted” by [the claimant]. [Touche Ross & Co. v.] Redington, 442 U.S. [560,] 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479 [, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979) ]. We recognize that just because “a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.” Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 , 99 S.Ct. 1946 , 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). “The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.” Id. at 578, 99 S.Ct. 2479 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through the statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.