Binstock v. Tschider’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Our task on appeal from summary judgment is to determine: ‘Did the information available to the trial court, when viewed in a light most favorable to the opposing party, preclude the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and entitle the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law?’ Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 537 (N.D.1981).” Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D.1985).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dosland v. Netland · Davis v. Satrom

2. “[a] party resisting a motion for summary judgment has the responsibility of presenting competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means, ... and, if appropriate, drawing the court's attention to evidence in the record... raising a material factual issue, or from which the court may draw an inference creating a material factual issue.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stewart v. Ryan · Richmond v. Haney

3. “In determining when an action for legal malpractice is barred by the passage of time, we recently said in Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471, 473 (N.D.1985): The two-year statute of limitations under Section 28-01-18(3), NDCC, is applicable to an action brought against an attorney for professional malpractice. Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1981). The statute commences to run when, “plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, (1) of the injury, (2) its cause, and (3) defendant’s possible negligence.” Phillips Fur and Wool Co. v. Bailey, 340 N.W.2d 448, 449 (N.D.1983). [[Image here]] A cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not commence to run, until the client has incurred some damage. (Citations omitted.) The proposition is succinctly stated by the California Supreme Court in Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal.3d 195 , 98 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 491 P.2d 433 (1971): ... until the client suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of his attorney’s negligence, the client cannot establish a cause of action for malpractice ... The cause of action arises, however, before the client sustains all, or even the greater part, of the damages occasioned by his attorney’s negligence .... Any appreciable and actual harm flowing from the attorney’s negligent conduct establishes a cause of action upon which the client may sue.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Larson v. Norkot Manufacturing, Inc.