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375 F.2d 737

Docket No. 16188.

Jones v. Bombeck

Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted March 21, 1967.

Decided March 27, 1967.

Third Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1967-03-27

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“While entrapment may be a proper defense in a criminal action, a police officer's participation in such an activity does not constitute a constitutional violation.”

quoted by 6 later decisions, including Wesley Smith v. Rick J. Lang, Giovanetti Dds

“We can discern no reason why the statute should be tolled because the appellant was incarcerated.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Williams v. Hollins

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Monroe v. Pape · O'Sullivan v. Felix · Thomas v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1967-03-27

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently September 2010 · most notably Ammlung v. City of Chester (1974), Duncan v. Nelson (1972)

26 federal appellate · 2 district ·

240196719701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*738Donald L. Jones, pro se.

¶2E. V. Buckley, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Mercer & Buckley, Pittsburgh, on the brief), for appellees.

¶3Before STALEY, Chief Judge, and KALODNER and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

¶4OPINION OF THE COURT

¶5PER CURIAM.

¶6This is an appeal from the dismissal of a civil rights action commenced under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The complaint alleges that the defendants, acting in conspiracy among themselves and with others, induced the plaintiff to commit and participated with him in the commission of a burglary for which he was apprehended and is now serving a sentence.

¶7The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action and that, on its face, it was barred by the statute of limitations. We fully agree with the district court’s disposition.

¶8 To state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act it is necessary that there be an allegation that plaintiff was denied or that there was a conspiracy to deny him a constitutional right, privilege or immunity. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Here, at best, all that appellant has alleged is entrapment. While entrapment may be a proper defense in a criminal action, a police officer’s participation in such activity does not constitute a constitutional violation.

¶9We also approve the district court’s alternative ground for dismissal. In the absence of a congressionally-enacted time limitation for the bringing of such actions, the state statute of limitations should be applied. O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed 980 (1914); Gaito v. Strauss, 249 F.Supp; 923 (W.D.Pa.), aff’d per curiam, 368 F.2d 787 (C.A.3, 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 1173, 18 L.Ed.2d 139 (March 20, 1967); Conard v. Stitzel, 225 F.Supp. 244 (E.D.Pa.1963). Assuming that the Pennsylvania two year statute of limitations applied,1 12 Purdon’s Pa.Stat.Ann. § 34, it is clear that this action was filed well beyond the permissible *739date. We can discern no reason why the statute should be tolled because the appellant was incarcerated.

¶10The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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