State v. Green’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 86 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 88 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Judge Raker, speaking for this Court, has drawn a bright line, demarcating the point at which an ordinary traffic stop ends: In sum, the officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. at 1325-26 . Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir.1994). 355 Md. at 372 , 735 A.2d at 499 . This language clarifies that, after a traffic citation or warning has been issued, the Fourth Amendment allows only (1) consensual encounters between the police officer and driver, and (2) detentions supported by, at least, reasonable articulable suspicion.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Byndloss v. State · McCree v. State

2. “The ultimate burden of proving that evidence seized without a warrant should not be suppressed falls on the State. In reviewing a Circuit Court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, we ordinarily consider only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the trial record. Where, as here, the motion to suppress was denied, we view the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the State, the prevailing party on the motion. With respect to weighing and determining first-level facts (such as the number of officers at the scene, the time of day, whether certain words were spoken, etc.), we extend great deference to the fact-finding of the suppression hearing judge. Therefore, “when conflicting evidence is presented, we accept the facts as found by the hearing judge unless it is shown that his findings are clearly erroneous.” As to the ultimate conclusion of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation, however, “we must make our own independent constitutional appraisal by reviewing the law and applying the facts of the case.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. E. SIFRIT v. State

3. “when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a driver has broken a traffic law, the officer may detain the driver temporarily 'to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with intent to issue a citation or warning'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 239 Md. App. 440 - Steck v. State