State v. Abercrombie’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
77 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 79 later decisions — most recently February 2008 · most notably 523 So. 2d 1305 - State v. Mussall (1988), State v. Richardson (1983)
77 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · 277 So. 2d 126 - State v. Prieur · 278 So. 2d 781 - State v. Moore · State v. Matthews · State v. Johnson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
14 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Bell · State v. Eskano“"While intent and motive are frequently regarded as one and the same thing, there is a clear distinction between them. Motive is the cause or reason that moves the will and induces action for a definite result, while intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result."... In State v. Sutfield, 354 So.2d 1334, 1336-37 (La.1978), we recognized that evidence of other crimes may be admissible if the evidence is relevant to show motive, i.e., to show that the defendant had a reason to commit the crime he is charged with....”
9 later decisions quote this exact passage“However, in the last analysis, it is rather a question of law than of medicine as to what the cognizable `wrong' is; a legal rather than a medical question is presented by the issue of whether an accused is legally insane who knows it is legally wrong to kill another human being, but who does not know it is morally wrong (being under a delusion or compulsion produced by severe mental disease). Indeed, the predominant practice in American jurisdictions seems without discussion to leave it to the factual determination of the trial jury to determine whether the defendant was capable of knowing right from `wrong' with regard to the conduct complained of, without specifying as a matter of law whether the defendant must know it to be `morally' or instead `legally' wrong. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law 278-279 (1972). The jury is thus free to exculpate for legal insanity on either basis, providing that the inability to know is a product of a mental disease or defect." (Emphasis added). At 1178.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.