Ritter v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, between principals in the first and second degrees, in cases of felony, is abolished; and all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid or abet in its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted, tried and punished as principals, as in the case of misdemeanors.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Tomlin v. State · 375 So. 2d 270 - Ex Parte Ritter

2. “In brief, it was really simply a matter of logistics that Ritter did not also fire his weapon, i.e., his companion Evans, according to his own statement, was in his line of fire. In our original opinion, and in this extension this court had carefully reviewed all of the evidence and did not, and does not now, rely upon the felony murder doctrine to imply evidence of intent on the part of Ritter in this cause. To the contrary, Ritter’s active participation in the Nassar murder supplies the requisite intent for an intentional killing necessary under Section 13-ll-2(a), Code of Alabama, 1975, which is the aggravated offense of robbery when the victim is intentionally killed by the defendant.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 568 F. Supp. 1499 - Ritter v. Smith

3. “I believe the facts of the instant case bring the appellant within the capital felony statute via the accomplice statute. He could be charged equally with Evans for the murder of Edward Nassar even though he did not personally fire the weapon. In planning the robbery, Evans and Ritter had discussed that they might have to kill someone during the course of the robbery. Ritter stated that he would have shot Nassar if Evans had not been in his line of fire. Each would therefore be guilty equally under the accomplice statute. Howell v. State, Ala.Crim.App., 339 So.2d 138 (1976).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 568 F. Supp. 1499 - Ritter v. Smith