375 So. 2d 270 - Ex Parte Ritter’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, between principals in the first and second degrees, in cases of felony, is abolished; and all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid or abet in its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted, tried and punished as principals, as in the case of misdemeanors.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ritter v. State · Tomlin v. State

2. “". . . Under the Alabama death penalty statute the requisite intent to kill may not be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine 2 ."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 374 So. 2d 363 - Horsley v. State · 435 So. 2d 754 - Womack v. State

3. “Ritter also contends that the death penalty is a disproportionate sentence in light of his involvement in the capital felony and therefore violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ritter attempts to bolster his position by portraying himself as a mere accomplice to the robbery, “a minor participant” in a crime which led to a killing by someone else. The record, however, refutes this description of Ritter’s part in the crime at every point. It was Ritter, not Evans, who asked to see a .38 caliber Colt revolver, who began to load it with ammunition he had brought with him specifically for this purpose, and who carried the revolver out of the pawn shop after Nassar was shot. Thus Ritter could not seriously be considered a “minor participant” in the robbery, and, as we have noted above, he was clearly an accomplice to the killing. With this more accurate description of Ritter’s participation in the intentional killing and robbery in mind we must consider whether the death penalty is a disproportionate sentence for an accomplice to the killing. This is a question which has not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court, although several cases before the Court have raised the issue.... In each of these cases the court reversed on other grounds. It did not reach the issue of disproportionality. While we opine that there may be situations where an accomplice’s participation is so minor that the death penalty would be constitutionally impermissible, such is not the case”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 568 F. Supp. 1499 - Ritter v. Smith