In Re Jackson’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
5
cited by 5 later decisions
April 2013
most recently cited
1 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 522 · 11 U.S.C. § 541
Relies on Matter of Williams · In Re Hurst
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) debtor’s present and anticipated living expenses; (2) debtor’s present and anticipated income from all sources; (3) the age of the debtor and his or her dependents; (4) the health of debtor and his or her dependents; (5) debtor’s ability to earn a living; (6) debtor’s job skills, training and education; (7) debtor’s other assets, including exempt assets; (8) the liquidity of these other assets; (9) debtor’s ability to save for retirement; (10) the special needs of the debtor and his or her dependents; and (11) debtor’s continuing financial obligations, e.g., alimony or support payments.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. In Re Lyons · In Re John“[sjection 522(d)(ll)(E) specifies an exemption for “a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor ... to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 522 (d)(ll)(E). The clear and unambiguous language of the statute creates an estate on the petition date and allows an exemption for a loss of any future earnings after creation of that estate. Jackson and Shelton argue that the term “future” applies to all earnings after the date of their termination, not the date of the petition. Such a reading of the statute is against its clear language. To allow an exemption for earnings prior to the petition date would make the statute retroactive instead of future looking. That reading would render the operative term of the statute—“future”—obsolete and defeat the statute’s purpose. Under Jackson and Shelton’s interpretation, a debtor could receive a lump sum payment in settlement of a dispute years prior to the petition date and still claim that amount as an exemption even though their entitlement to the asset accrued before the petition was filed. That cannot be correct. In order for the term “future” to have any meaning, the earnings exempted must account for a period in the future from the date the estate is created.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Jackson v. Novak“Property of the estate, and a debtor’s exemption therein, is determined as of the bankruptcy petition date.... Section 522(d)(ll)(E) refers only to post-petition loss of earnings, and the debtor may not exempt that portion of the settlement proceeds that provided compensation of his prepetition loss of earnings.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Jackson v. Novak
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.