Brennan's Inc’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate with respect to an issue if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for a party on that issue. This occurs when the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary verdict. In considering a Rule 50 motion, the court must review all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are jury functions. In reviewing the record as a whole, the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unim-peached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 516 F. Supp. 2d 639 - Jacobs v. Tapscott · 795 F. Supp. 2d 493 - Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Eland Energy, Inc.

2. “We point out that the defendants do not raise the theory, adopted by some courts but not by others, that a stranger to a consent-to-use agreement can use the agreement against the mark-holder as an admission that certain uses do not create confusion, though other courts reject such a theory. See 2 McCarthy § 18:81. In terms of the facts of this case, the argument would be that the plaintiffs’ consent, to let Dickie use certain names could be turned against the plaintiffs if they brought an infringement case against other parties for similar conduct, on the theory that even strangers to the consent-to-use agreement could use the plaintiffs’ contract with Dick-ie as an admission that such uses do not ■ produce confusion. Since the defendants have not raised this particular theory in their brief in defense of either the companies or Richard Sr., we accordingly express nó opinion on whether such a theory is a viable defense in an infringement suit.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan

3. “By its terms, the language of the agreement does not preclude such a suit, for it provides only that Brennan’s “shall not object ... so long as ” Dickie follows the contract’s guidelines. The contract does not say that Brennan’s has relinquished the right to pursue trademark remedies for uses that are not permitted by the agreement.... The agreement accordingly cannot be taken to mean that Brennan’s has implicitly given up its preexisting right to pursue trademark claims as to unauthorized uses. Put differently, the fact that Brennan’s permitted Dickie to engage in certain specified uses without fear of liability does not mean that Dickie is thereby immunized from trademark liability for all unauthorized uses.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. A2D Technologies Inc v. MJ Systems Inc, et