¶1specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶2I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the affirmance of the trial court but strenuously object to the ruminations of the majority attempting to override O’Casek and resurrect Cargill. However, I agree the legislature clearly intended to retain the “identity of the health-care professional” language.
¶3In Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 660, 818 N.E.2d at 904, this court noted that Public Act 90 — 579 contained the same language regarding the identity of the health-care professional and voluntary dismissals that had been contained in Pubic Act 89 — 7. The Cargill court concluded that Public Act 90 — 579 resurrected the amendments to section 2 — 622 of the Code as inserted by Public Act 89 — 7. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 661, 818 N.E.2d at 905.
¶4As noted in the majority, however, more recently, in O’Casek, another panel of this court found that the legislative enactments following Cargill demonstrated that the legislature never reenacted the civil-reform language regarding voluntary dismissals contained in Public Act 89 — 7 but instead continued in effect the earlier pre-1995 version of section 2 — 622(a)(2) of the Code. O’Casek, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 512-13. Because O’Casek did not expressly make any ruling regarding the “identity of the health-care professional” language in section 2 — 622(a)(1), the majority’s disagreement herein with O’Casek is at best inappropriate and mere dicta.
¶5An examination of the history of section 2 — 622 demonstrates that, as O’Casek held, the legislature never intended to reenact the voluntary-dismissal language contained in Public Act 89 — 7. However, the legislature did intend to reenact the language pertaining to the identification of the health-care professional. This fact distinguishes the instant case from O’Casek.
¶6The following chart details the legislative changes:
¶7[[Image here]]
¶8[[Image here]]
¶9Because the legislature clearly intended to retain the “identity of the health-care professional” language, this case is distinguishable from O’Casek, and the majority cannot overrule O’Casek. For this reason, I dissent insofar as the majority purports to do so.