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← 376 NW2D 196 - State v. Sanders

State v. Sanders’s Empirical Analysis

1985

Citation profile

35
cited by 35 later decisions
2
states following
July 2017
most recently cited

35 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently July 2017 · most notably State v. Anderson (1985), State v. Mitjans (1987)

35 state decisions

1501985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · United States v. Cronic · Smith v. Phillips · Remmer v. United States · Rushen v. Spain

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Photographs are admissible as competent evidence where they accurately portray anything which is competent for a witness to describe in words, or where they are helpful as an aid to a verbal description of objects and conditions, provided they are relevant to some material issue; and they are not rendered inadmissible merely because they vividly bring to jurors the details of a shocking crime or incidentally tend to arouse passion or prejudice.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “In this case the defendant did not claim that the killing was accidental. Rather, he admitted that he must have used the knife to defend himself but that he did not intend to kill the victim. As we held in State v. Malaski, 330 N.W.2d 447 (Minn.1983), it is inappropriate in such a case for the trial court to state that the defendant’s “election to kill” must have been reasonable; instead, the trial court should state that the defendant’s “election to defend himself in the way he did” must have been reasonable. Id. at 453 . Arguably, the instruction in this case that “the killing must have been done in the belief that it was necessary to avert death or great bodily harm” is language that would better fit a case in which the defendant claimed he intentionally killed in self-defense. However, considering the entire instruction on self defense in the context of the entire case, including the arguments of counsel, we conclude that any technical deficiency in the self-defense instruction in this respect was nonprejudicial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Defendant concedes that it was appropriate for the trial court to use the language for CRIMJIG 7.08 to the effect that the legal excuse of self-defense “includes the duty to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible.” He argues, however, that the use of both CRIMJIG 7.08 and CRIMJIG 7.05, with its condition that “defendant’s election to defend himself must have been such as a reasonable man would have made in the light of the danger to be apprehended and the existence of any alternative way of avoiding the danger,” excessively emphasized the defendant’s duty to retreat. We disagree. CRIMJIG 7.08 was drafted in such a way that it could be given in connection with * * * CRIMJIG 7.05 (self-defense — causing death) * * *. Furthermore, we have approved CRIM-JIG 7.08 in a number of cases, including cases in which it was given in conjunction with CRIMJIG 7.05.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.