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← 377 P2D 815 - Coe v. Esau

Coe v. Esau’s Empirical Analysis

1963

Citation profile

48
cited by 48 later decisions
15
states following
July 2024
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 35 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 48 later decisions — most recently July 2024 · most notably Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc. (1978), Flick v. Crouch (1967)

6 federal appellate · 35 state decisions — followed in 15 states

1601963197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Texas Co. v. Wheat · Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Carsten · 124 So. 2d 517 - Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Company · Greiving ex rel. Greiving v. La Plante · Sherman v. Texas Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““It is indeed a matter of common knowledge and practice that distinctive colors and trade mark signs are displayed at gasoline stations by independent dealers of petroleum product suppliers. These signs and emblems represent no more than notice to the motorist that a given company’s products are being marketed at the station.” (Citing cases.) * * * “Whether relation of master and servant does in fact exist between lessor of gasoline station and its lessee so as to render the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable, depends on whether lessor has the right to control, or exercises the right to control, lessee in the details of the work to be performed in the operation and management of the station-. [Citing cases.] “The facts and circumstances adduced by plaintiff’s evidence are insufficient to raise the necessary inference that Continental either had the right to control or exercised the right to control the conduct of Esau in the operation of his station. Esau was free to, and did handle, tires and automotive accessories of other suppliers; he procured his own personnel, determined the daily business hours and the methods of doing business. The petroleum products supplied by Continental were sold to Esau on a cash basis. So far as the record discloses, Esau was not in any way restricted in adopting his own merchandising policies.” Id. 377 P. 2d 818 -19.”
    11 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “‘ ‘ In support of his argument that Esau was an agent of Continental in the operation of the filling station where the faulty service work was performed upon plaintiff’s automobile, plaintiff calls our attention to these facts: (1) Continental owned the premises upon which the filling station in question was situated; (b) Continental’s name or trade mark was prominently displayed upon the station premises; (c) The name ‘Conoco’, Continental’s trade mark for its gasoline and oil products, would appear on advertising matter and handbills distributed by Esau; (b) In the classified pages of the Tulsa telephone directory Esau’s station was listed under the heading ‘Conoco Service Stations’ and Continental’s triangular trade mark; (e) Esau extended the privilege of charging for gasoline, oil and service sold to all holders of Continental credit cards who were billed directly by Continental; (f) Esau received advice and suggestions from Continental concerning the standard of cleanliness at his station, although he did not have to ‘abide’ by them; (g) In consideration for the use of the station premises and equipment Esau paid one and one-fourth cents on each gallon of gasoline sold; (h) Although Esau controlled his business hours, he was required to occupy the premises and operate the station ‘or he would lose such right’ ”.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““When an automobile has been damaged by the negligence of another and can be repaired, the proper measure of damages is the cost of the repairs and the value of the loss of the use of it while it is being repaired. If it cannot be repaired then the measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the automobile before it was damaged and the value of the wreckage." [emphasis added].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.