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← 377 So. 2d 17 - Baker v. State

377 So. 2d 17 - Baker v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1979

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
2
states following
September 2006
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 31 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently September 2006 · most notably 588 So. 2d 957 - Department of Law Enf. v. Real Property (1991), 537 So. 2d 564 - Magaw v. State (1989)

1 federal appellate · 31 state decisions

2001979198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Gregg v. Georgia · Lockett v. Ohio · Coker v. Georgia · Bessie Cannon v. State of Florida · 336 So. 2d 586 - Filmon v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated involves culpability. We are not here dealing with the type of statute which imposes strict criminal liability for mere negligence or an act malum prohibitum. Given, then, that the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a reckless (and therefore culpable) act, is it rational for the legislature to impose criminal sanctions for any death which occurs without regard to the tort law concept of proximate causation between operation of the automobile and the death? If the legislature can reasonably conclude that such a measure operates as a deterrent to those who create a recognized and serious social problem, then certainly it is. (footnotes omitted).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Under this law as construed by the Court today, the following application is possible. An intoxicated person drives an automobile to an intersection and properly stops at a stop light. While there in a stationary position, the vehicle is struck from behind by another automobile due to negligent operation by the driver. The negligent driver dies from injuries received in the collision. The completely passive, nonnegligent but intoxicated motorist can be convicted of DWI manslaughter and imprisoned for fifteen years.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “[N]either negligence nor proximate causation is an element of the crime embodied in section 860.01(2), Florida Statutes (1977), and the failure to include them as elements of proof does not deprive appellant of due process of law.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.