¶1Harold Bissonnet, Houston, Tex., for appellant.
¶2Robert S. Travis, William L. Johnson, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Fort Worth, Tex., Melvin M. Diggs, U. S. Atty., Bailey F. Rankin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for appellee.
¶3Before THORNBERRY, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.
¶5Appellant Puryear and co-defendant Estes were found guilty by jury verdict of having transported a stolen automobile in interstate commerce with knowledge that it had been stolen in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
¶6The primary contention raised by appellant’s able court-appointed counsel concerns the admissibility, under Escobedo,1of certain remarks made by appellant to the arresting officer before he had been told of his right to remain silent and to have the benefit of counsel. No objection was made at trial to the admission of the testimony now complained of. We are asked, however, to *30hold that its admission was plain error under Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., 18 U. S.C. This we decline to do. Where no good reason is shown for the failure of appellant’s trial counsel to object to the admission of evidence, the objection is deemed to have been waived. Toland v. United States, 9th Cir. 1966, 365 F.2d 304; Bouchard v. United States, 9th Cir. 1965, 344 F.2d 872. We are not confronted here with a situation that would lead us to hold that the introduction of the testimony in dispute so prejudiced the defendant’s case in the eyes of the jury as to result in a miscarriage of justice. See Gray v. United States, 1962, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 311 F.2d 126.
¶7Appellant also contends that the charge to the jury was improper in that it was not in accordance with the decision of this Court in Young v. United States, 5th Cir. 1938, 97 F.2d 200. This claim is based upon the assertion that certain language in Young requires that where the government introduces into evidence an exculpatory statement of a defendant, the statement must be taken as true by the jury unless the government proves its falsity beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if we assume that this doubtful proposition be the law of this Circuit,2 it would not benefit the appellant. No objection was made to the trial court’s charge and clearly, upon the facts of this case, the supposed error asserted by appellant cannot be classified as plain error under Rule 52(b). Having concluded that the other contentions raised by the appellant are without merit, we affirm.