¶1Before the Court at Docket 292 is Defendant John Pearl Smith, II's Motion to Strike All Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors in Their Entirety. The Government *792filed an opposition.
¶2Mr. Smith's facial challenge to the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) consists of three arguments: First, he maintains that the plain text of the FDPA does not authorize the Government "to utilize non-statutory aggravating factors in pursuit of a death sentence."
¶3I. The text of the FDPA does not prohibit the use of non-statutory aggravating factors.
¶4Mr. Smith asserts that the plain language of the FDPA prohibits non-statutory aggravating factors. Specifically, he claims that "§ 3592(c) of the [FDPA] contradicts § 3591(a) of the statute."
¶5The Government does not address Mr. Smith's textual argument but emphasizes that non-statutory aggravators have been upheld by the Supreme Court and circuit courts.
¶6Courts that have considered this exact argument have concluded that it is without merit.
¶7Further, interpreting section 3591(a) to exclude any consideration of non-statutory factors would nullify section 3592(c)'s permission to consider "whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists." Statutes "should not be construed so as to render any provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous."
¶8In United States v. Cheever , the district court pointed to other portions of the FDPA that presume the use of non-statutory aggravating factors in a capital sentencing. Section 3593(a) "expressly mentions victim impact evidence .... Since this aggravating factor is not expressly enumerated in section 3592(c), it is obvious that section 3593(a) contemplates the use of what is generally referred to as non-statutory aggravating factors."
¶9Mr. Smith maintains that the FDPA's provision for appellate review reinforces that non-statutory aggravators may not be considered by a jury because the provision "makes reference only to aggravating factors considered by the jury under § 3592."
¶10The reasoning of Llera Plaza and Cheever is persuasive. The FDPA, read in whole, contemplates that the jury may consider non-statutory aggravating factors for which the Government has given notice.
¶11II. The FDPA's procedure does not create an impermissible risk that the death penalty will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously.
¶12Mr. Smith next asserts that allowing the use of non-statutory aggravating factors authorizes "the Government to unilaterally expand the list of aggravating factors on a case-by-case basis ...." despite the FDPA's lack of guidance in selecting these factors.
¶13The Government responds that "non-statutory aggravators are not required to narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty .... Non-statutory aggravators individualize the selection of the appropriate sentence by calling the jury's attention to the individualized circumstances of the crime and character of the defendant."
¶14The Supreme Court has recognized that there is some incongruity between the need in the eligibility phase to limit and guide the jury's discretion to avoid arbitrary death sentences and the need in the selection phase to give the jury as much relevant information as possible so that it makes an individualized determination of the appropriate penalty.
¶15Non-statutory aggravating factors are used only in the selection portion of capital sentencing, after a defendant has already been found eligible for the death penalty.
¶16However, non-statutory aggravators are not entirely unregulated. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that "there are a number of limitations on the government's power to pursue non-statutory aggravators."
¶17If the Government selects non-statutory aggravating factors that violate these requirements, they may be struck from the notice of intent. The federal government does not have unlimited authority to create and present non-statutory aggravating factors.
¶18III. The use of non-statutory aggravating factors in the Notice of Intent does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
¶19Mr. Smith next asserts that non-statutory aggravating factors are elements of the charged homicides, and "permitting the Justice Department to insert ... necessary elements to the charged crime violates the ex post facto clause."
¶20The Ex Post Facto Clause is triggered by laws that "retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts."
¶21The "elements" that expose a capital defendant to the death penalty are those elements listed in the substantive statute along with one gateway/threshold intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor.
¶22In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the motion at Docket 292 is DENIED.
¶23Docket 315.
¶24Docket 292 at 5.
¶25Docket 292 at 8.
¶26Docket 292 at 12.
¶27Docket 292 at 6.
¶28Docket 292 at 6-7.
¶29Docket 315 at 4-6 (citing Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) ; Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) ; Barclay v. Florida , 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Bolden , 545 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Robinson , 367 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2004) ; and United States v. Higgs , 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003) ).
¶30SeeUnited States v. George , No. CR 17-201, 2019 WL 343186, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2019) (listing cases so holding).
¶31179 F. Supp. 2d 444, 459 (E.D. Penn. 2001).
¶34Llera Plaza , 179 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (citing Beck v. Prupis , 529 U.S. 494, 506, 120 S.Ct. 1608, 146 L.Ed.2d 561 (2000) ); see alsoRobinson , 367 F.3d at 293 (defendant's "tortured reading" of FDPA ignored rules of statutory construction: "When the statute is read as a coherent whole, the two provisions are not in tension, because § 3592 adequately 'sets forth' the non-statutory aggravating factors by providing that the jury may consider them.").
¶35423 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1208 (D. Kan. 2006).
¶36Id. (emphasis in original); see alsoUnited States v. Umana , 707 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (W.D. N.C. 2010) (rejecting defendant's identical argument because sections 3592(c) and 3593(d) authorize jury to consider non-statutory aggravating factors).
¶37Docket 292 at 7 n. 3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3595 ).
¶3818 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1).
¶39United States v. Frank , 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (emphasis in original) (holding the FDPA provides meaningful appellate review of death sentences).
¶4018 U.S.C. § 3595(b), (c)(1).
¶4118 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2)(c).
¶42Cf.United States v. Mitchell , 502 F.3d 931, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) (summarily stating that "the FDPA authorizes consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors" although not considering textual argument); Babbitt v. Calderon , 151 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended Aug. 27, 1998 (considering California state sentencing and noting that "[n]othing in the Constitution limits the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors").
¶43Docket 292 at 8.
¶44Docket 292 at 7-9.
¶45Docket 315 at 7.
¶46Tuilaepa v. California , 512 U.S. 967, 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994).
¶47Brown v. Sanders , 546 U.S. 212, 216 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 884, 163 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006).
¶48United States v. Allen , 247 F.3d 741, 757 (8th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds , 536 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002).
¶5018 U.S.C. § 3593(e) ; Mitchell , 502 F.3d at 979.
¶51United States v. George , No. CR 17-201, 2019 WL 343186, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2019) (citing Allen , 247 F.3d at 747 ).
¶52Tuilaepa v. California , 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) (emphasis in original).
¶53Id. at 979-80, 114 S.Ct. 2630 (internal quotation omitted); Mitchell , 502 F.3d at 977 ("once [defendant] became death eligible, all of the aggravating factors-statutory and non-statutory alike-and all of the mitigating factors were thrown into the pot to be weighed by the jury as it saw fit.").
¶54Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. 862, 878-79, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) ("[T]he Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other [non-statutory] possible aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class [of persons eligible for the death penalty], those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death.").
¶55Mitchell , 502 F.3d at 979.
¶56Tuilaepa , 512 U.S. at 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630.
¶58Tuilaepa , 512 U.S. at 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630.
¶59Arave v. Creech , 507 U.S. 463, 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) ); cf.Jones v. United States , 527 U.S. 373, 401, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (plurality opinion) (noting that Supreme Court has not considered what it means for a selection factor, rather than an eligibility factor, to be overbroad).
¶60United States v. Bin Laden , 126 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
¶61SeeUnited States v. Jones , 132 F.3d 232, 239 (5th Cir. 1998) ("the prosecution does not have carte blanche in devising non-statutory aggravating factors").
¶62Docket 292 at 12. The Ex Post Facto Clause is found at Article I, § 9, clause 3 of the Constitution ("No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
¶63530 U.S. 466, 490, 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum is functionally an element of a greater offense and must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
¶64536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (applying Apprendi to capital sentencings).
¶65--- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) (invalidating Florida's capital sentencing scheme because it did not require jury findings to impose death penalty).
¶66Docket 315 at 10. However, the Government has also stated that the eligibility factors (threshold intent and statutory aggravators) "are functionally equivalent to elements of an offense" for the purposes of being included in an indictment. Docket 315 at 2-3.
¶67Docket 315 at 10.
¶68Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990).
¶69Cheever , 423 F. Supp. 2d at 1207-08 ("[E]ven accepting for sake of argument defendant's conclusion that Ring created a new offense of federal capital murder ... the 'elements' of such a crime would at most include one of the gateway intent factors and one statutory aggravating factor."). The jury must also find that the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a).
¶7018 U.S.C. §§ 3591, 3593 ; Mitchell , 502 F.3d at 979.
¶71SeeHiggs , 353 F.3d at 322 ("[N]onstatutory aggravating factors and mitigating factors are weighed by the jury to make the individualized determination to impose the death sentence upon a defendant who has already been found eligible. They do not increase the possible punishment or alter the elements of the offense."); Allen , 247 F.3d at 759 ("proposing nonstatutory aggravating factors to the jury does not in any way alter the definition of the underlying crime for which Allen was convicted, nor does it increase the punishment to which Allen is subjected"); see alsoUnited States v. George , No. CR 17-201, 2019 WL 343186, at *4 n. 17 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2019) (listing cases rejecting argument that selection of non-statutory factors after the crime has been committed violates Ex Post Facto Clause).
¶72--- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016).