¶1dissenting:
¶2I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, denying counsel fees in this case for noncompliance with a post-judgment discovery order. Respondent’s abhorrent conduct was not a violation of the Security Deposit Act. Petitioner recovered counsel fees that were permissible under the Security Deposit Act. There is no other provision for the recovery of fees under that Act. The general rule regarding counsel fees applies — that a party may not recover attorney fees and expenses of litigation in his or her claim against the other party defendant unless it arises from specific statutory provisions or the contract of the parties. See Bausch & Lomb v. Utica Mutual, 355 Md. 566, 590, 735 A.2d 1081, 1094 (1999).
¶3The majority holds that petitioner is entitled to counsel fees because, as a remedial statute, it must be construed liberally, and that liberal construction includes recovery of counsel fees to enforce the judgment. I disagree. The majority has expanded significantly the concept of fee-shifting, with no indication of where it will end.