majority">O’Hara, J.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals1 affirming judgment non obstante veredicto for defendants Ernest Brown and Edna Brown.

Stanley D. Muma is a minor. At tbe time he sustained the injuries for which these suits were brought, he was 3 years old.

Larry Brown at the time of the occurrence of the events complained of was 14 years old. Ernest and Edna Brown are his parents. Stanley E. Muma is the minor plaintiff’s father. Guardian Betty Muma is his mother. Two actions were instituted; one was by the injured minor’s father, the other by the guardian. They were consolidated for trial and submitted to the jury on 2 special questions, which are here set forth:

“1. Did Larry Brown have the implied consent of his parents Ernest and Edna Brown to drive their Dodge car on August 16, 1957, the day of the accident?

“2. Did the parents of Larry Brown fail to supervise him on the day of the accident?”

To question number 1, the jury answered “no.” To question number 2, it answered “yes.” It re*642turned a verdict for $5,668.55 for medical expense and $7,000 for general damages against both the minor driver and Ms parents.

This case was tried in February, 1962, prior to the adoption of the revised judicature act. The special question procedure was controlled by CL 1948, § 618.39 (Stat Ann § 27.1019), which provided:

“In all cases where an issue of facts is tried before any court of record, the court shall at the request in writing, of the counsel of either party, instruct the jury if they return a general verdict, also to find upon particular questions of facts, respecting which the issue is joined, to be stated in writing, and shall direct a written finding thereon: Provided, Such special questions shall not exceed 5 in number, and shall be each in single, short sentences, readily answered by yes or no. The special verdict, or finding, shall be filed with the clerk, and entered upon the minutes, and when any special finding of facts shall be inconsistent with a general verdict, the former shall control the latter, and the court give judgment accordingly.”

We must apply the statute and the case precedent interpreting it to the case at bar. The first special question was directed to the liability of the defendant parents under the Michigan motor vehicle ownership statute.2 That statute renders the owner of a motor vehicle liable for its negligent operation by another, if such operation is with the express or implied knowledge or consent of the owner. Additionally, it provides that where the operation is by a son of the owner as here, there is a presumption that such operation is with the owner’s knowledge and consent. This, however, is a rebuttable presumption. Fob an extended discussion of the nature of the presump*643tion and the evidence necessary to overcome it, see Krisher v. Duff, 331 Mich 699.

Knowledge and consent having been placed in issue and evidence bearing on that issue being in conflict, a fact question for the jury arose. On this issue the jury held with the defendants. The negative answer to the first special question exculpated the parents from the statutorily imposed liability.. This finding was at variance with the general verdict against them. Under the settled law as of the time • of trial, clearly the statute and the cases mandate . that the special findings control the general verdict. • This precedent has been settled since as early as Cole v. Boyd, 47 Mich 98. Manifestly we must apply it. Thus, under the statute the parents did not become liable for the negligent operation of the motor vehicle by their son.

Plaintiffs further declared on the theory that the parents having absented themselves from the family home for a weekend, leaving the minor son unsupervised and a set of car keys available, became liable for-his negligent operation of the automobile under common law. This theory also became the subject of special question number 2, earlier set forth. To this question the jury answered “yes.” Thus, there was no variance between the answer to the second special finding and the general verdict. The question therefore becomes whether plaintiff’s judgment on this theory was supported by proof. On this issue the trial court held :

' “The court feels' that it would be stretching the common-law theory of parents’ liability for failure or lack of parental supervision, if the judgment or verdict rendered against the defendants, insofar as the defendants Ernest Brown and Edna Brown are concerned, was permitted to stand. To say that the defendants Ernest Brown and Edna Brown were negligent, arid that their negligence was the proxi*644mate cause of the injuries complained of, would in the court’s opinion, be against the great weight of the testimony in this case. The testimony in the record in this case shows that the defendant Larry Brown was denied permission to use the family automobile, and there was no testimony showing that he did use it on any other occasion, than on the láth and 15th day of August! 1957. That prior to leaving for the weekend, the father Ernest Brown placed the automobile in the garage, which garage had no door on it, that he locked the ignition and the four car doors. That there is nothing in the record to show that the defendant Larry Brown knew where the mother’s keys were in the house. There is nothing in the record to show that the defendant Larry Brown was known to be reckless and incompetent. In this case, if the Court should agree with the plaintiff’s common-law theory, then it wouldn’t be safe for a parent to leave home, and leave your automobile while your minor child was home.

“Therefore, it is the decision of this court, that the motion non obstante veredicto should be granted insofar as the defendants Ernest Brown and Edna Brown are concerned, and that the motion as far as it applied to the defendant Larry Brown will be denied, and that the motion for a new trial as far as it applies to defendant Larry Brown will be denied.”

On review the Court of Appeals held:

“We are forced to look outside of our jurisdiction for guidelines in determining this issue of parental supervision.”

The question being one of first impression and of major significance, we granted leave. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals was as follows (pp 379, 380):

“It is evident then, that to impose liability on the parents for a negligent act of their child, the general rules of negligence must be applied. Thus, there *645must be some act of the parents that was the proximate cause of the injurious or damaging act. Further, the specific act of the child must be such that it was foreseeable by the parents. As to the question: Is lack of supervision actionable negligence? The rule is clearly stated in 67 CJS, Parent and Child, § 68, at 799, 800:

“ ‘In order to render a parent liable his or her negligence in the exercise of parental supervision must have some specific relation to the act of which complaint is made, and liability may not be predicated on a failure to supervise where supervision would not have rendered the parent aware of the possibility of tortious conduct of the child.’

“In the case at bar, defendant minor had never taken the car before without his parents’ consent. In fact, the only time he had ever driven it was with his father’s consent once in a gasoline station and a few times up and down the driveway.

“He did drive it the day before the accident, but this was after his parents had left for the weekend. Therefore, the defendant-parents could not have anticipated or foreseen that their son would take the car while they were away since he had never done so before. Whether the parents were remiss in their duty by leaving their 14-year-old boy home unsupervised for a 3-day weekend is not the question here. What the boy did, could have been done while he was left alone at home for a few hours.

“Since the law as stated above stresses foreseeability as a prerequisite to a finding of actionable negligence in cases of lack of parental supervision, and we find no such foreseeability here, we hereby affirm the lower court’s judgment.”

We agree in substance with the finding. Specifically, we hold that parental liability can attach in cases where a family-owned motor vehicle is operated by a child without the express or implied knowledge or consent of the parent owners, by reason of *646failure in the exercise of parental supervision. Such liability is predicated on the judicially knowledgeable fact as well as the settled law that an automobile in the hands of an unlicensed, inexperienced operator can be a dangerous instrumentality.3 Thus, if a parent knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, that an inexperienced minor operator over whom he can exercise supervision and control will undertake to operate a motor vehicle, the availability of which to such inexperienced driver is also under the control of the parent, the parent is under obligation to exercise a high degree of care to render the vehicle unavailable to the child. We are fully cognizant of the gravity of this parental responsibility. We of necessity equate it with danger to society arising by reason of the operation of motor vehicles by inexperienced minors. We would not be understood to mean that any time a minor unauthorizedly operates a motor vehicle owned or controlled by his parents, the parents become liable for the minor’s tortious act. We stress, as did the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the reasonable foreseeability of the exigency. In the case at bar there was only the skimpiest evidence, if any, of previous unauthorized operation of the family car by the son.

On a motion for a directed verdict, or judgment non obstante veredicto, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom' the verdict was directed, or against whom judgment was entered notwithstanding the verdict. Fitzpatrick v. Ritzenhein, 367 Mich 326 (p 329).

So viewed the evidence here established nothing-more than the average interest of a minor in things mechanical and the almost universal impatience of the teenager to drive the family car. There is a vast *647difference between a request or desire to drive and a pattern of unauthorized driving. The latter should reasonably alert the parents to the likelihood that the minor would drive the car in their absence.

We are constrained in the factual context of this ease to affirm the Court of Appeals. Costs to the defendants Ernest and Edna Brown.

Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J. concurred with O’Hara, J.Black, J., concurred in the result.

CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1960 Bev § 9.2101,)

See Cobulak v. Lewis, 320 Mich 710, 722, 723 (5 ALR2d 186.)

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