State v. Luna’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A statement not specifically covered by any of §§ 19-16-30 to 19-16-34, inclusive, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by § 19-16-4 if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and if the court determines that (1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (3) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Davi · State v. Condon

2. “there was `a train of facts to point out the possible guilt of a third party other than the defendant.' Luna, 378 N.W.2d at 239-40 (Henderson, J., dissenting). Thus, [Larson's] proffered evidence should not have been kept from the jury.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. McDonald · State v. Larson

3. “A common ground for a motion for a new trial is that the jury, or members of it, has not performed in the fashion expected of juries. Attacks on this ground are frequently abortive because, as will be seen, the circumstances under which the jurors themselves may testify to impeach the verdict are very limited. [[Image here]] The correct rule is that a juror may testify about whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. A juror may not testify about statements made during the course of the jury’s deliberation nor may he testify about the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to the verdict or about his mental processes in connection with the verdict.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shamburger v. Behrens