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← 379 F.3d 919 - Smith v. Mullin

Smith v. Mullin’s Empirical Analysis

379 F.3d 919 · 2004

Citation profile

95
cited by 95 later decisions
6
states following
August 2022
most recently cited

50 federal appellate · 2 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 95 later decisions — most recently August 2022 · most notably Hooks v. Workman (2012), Bland v. Sirmons (2006)

50 federal appellate · 2 district · 8 state decisions

590200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · Williams v. Taylor · Coleman v. Thompson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 95 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requi site level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Death penalty litigation expert Dr. Craig Haney testified at the evidentiary hearing that “[jjuries respond to and find mitigating [this type of evidence,] and [they] are more likely to vote for life rather than death sentences in cases where there is ... clear and clearly presented evidence that the defendant has suffered from some form of mental illness_” E.H., vol. X, at 479-80. The available empirical evidence as to juror attitudes supports Dr. Haney’s conclusions. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 Co-lum. L.Rev. 1538, 1559 (1998) (finding evidence of mental retardation and mental illness to be the most persuasive mitigation evidence and to have practically no aggravating effect); Samuel P. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It’s Getting Personal, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 1448, 1468-69 (1998) (finding mental retardation to be “much more” mitigating than other potential factors). See also Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1211 (6th Cir.1996) (citing empirical evidence of juror sympathy to claims of “organic brain problems”); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 862 (7th Cir.1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (same).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.