Culberson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 102 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 121 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The clerk of the trial court, within ten (10) days after receiving the transcript, shall transmit the entire record and transcript to the Mississippi Supreme Court together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a report prepared by the trial judge. The notice shall set forth the title and docket number of the case, the name of the defendant and the name and address of his attorney, a narrative statement of the judgment, the offense, and the punishment prescribed. The report shall be in the form of a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Mississippi Supreme Court, a copy of which shall be served upon counsel for the state and counsel for the defendant. (2) The Mississippi Supreme Court shall consider the punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way of appeal. (3) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine: (a) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. (b) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section 99-19-101; and (c) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. (4) Both the defendant and the state shall have the ri”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hill v. State · 391 So. 2d 601 - Bullock v. State

2. “All states have endorsed the common-law concept of felony murder in some form. In it the felon is considered "at risk" while committing the felony so that if a homicide results, it is considered murder, or, as in our state, capital murder if associated with the felonies, designated by the legislature. The legislature's intent was to protect the citizenry from the evil of the lesser felony by imposing a greater penalty upon a homicide occurring during its commission. Some authorities view the felony murder statutes as imputing or irrebuttably presuming a specific intent to kill from the association of the homicide with the underlying felony. These same authorities acknowledge "( l )ong standing judicial approval of the presumption provides strong indication that the presumption comports with due process." The appellant argues, however, that only 0.5% of robberies result in homicide. Therefore, it cannot be said the robber in every case intended to kill. This may be true, but we think it overlooks the great danger the aggressor willfully imposes upon his victim. The constituent crime with its hazardous potential is that which the legislature intended to deter by permitting capital punishment if death results from the felonious undertaking. Presently, we can say without doubt the appellant schemed and participated in the unlawful undertaking which resulted in death. The subjunctive nature of the intention to kill makes it no less deliberate and no less deserving of capital punis”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reddix v. State · 882 So. 2d 135 - Bishop v. State

3. “"This leaves the question of whether the words in Subsection (3)(c), `imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,' include for our review and comparison the exact and therefore similar crime of the accomplice and the sentence received by him for it. We construe the language to include not only the capital cases heretofore determined by this Court in which the death sentence has been imposed or rejected on the merits, but also cases involving multiple defendants when one participant is given the death penalty and an accomplice less than death. One of the questions arising in such cases is whether a sentence of less than death to an accomplice was a result of prosecutorial discretion. An affirmative answer raises a second question, was the discretion abused? * * * * * * We hold prosecutorial discretion was not abused because Pittman, who did not fire the fatal shot, was permitted to plead guilty to manslaughter, while Culberson, the one who fired the fatal shot, was given the death penalty. We hold the death penalty was not applied capriciously in this case. It is a proper sentence for the senseless and unprovoked murder committed by Culberson, who, after first knocking the victim down with a table leg, then shot the victim while he was lying on the ground begging, `Help me, help me.'" 379 So.2d at 510 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Clemons v. State · 391 So. 2d 601 - Bullock v. State