Devlin v. Aetna Finance Co.’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
1 district · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (§ 102 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (§ 130 of the Truth in Lending Act)
Relies on 18 Ill. App. 3d 149 - Wood Acceptance Co. v. King · Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp. · 133 Ga. App. 336 - Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp. · 29 N.C. App. 78 - Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal · 50 Ohio App. 2d 338 - Continental Acceptance Corp. v. Rivera
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Many courts throughout the country have considered this question and numerous well-reasoned decisions have reached conflicting conclusions. The following cases conclude that a debtor may assert common law recoupment based on the Federal Truth In Lending Act despite the running of the one-year statute of limitations. Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill.App.3d 149 , 309 N.E.2d 403 (IllApp. 1st Dist.1974); Continental Acceptance Corp. v. Rivera, 50 Ohio App.2d 338 , 363 N.E.2d 772 (1976); Household Finance Corp. v. Hobbs, 387 A2d 198 (Super.Ct.Del.1978); Public Loan Company, Inc. v. Hyde, 63 A.D.2d 193 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 907 (3d Dept.1978); Stephens v. Household Finance Corp., 566 P.2d 1163 (Okl.1977). The foregoing is not a complete compilation of authorities but is representative. The following cases reach a contrary conclusion. This list is also representative only. Gillis v. Fisher Hardware, 289 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449 , 579 P.2d 1288 (1978); Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 29 N.C.App. 78 , 223 S.E.2d 831 (1976); Hodges v. Community Loan and Investment Corp. of North Georgia, 133 Ga.App. 336 , 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App.Div.1); aff'd, as mod., 234 Ga. 427 , 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975); Beneficial Finance Co. of Atlantic City v. Swaggerty, 159 N.J.Super. 507 , 388 A.2d 647 (1978); Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Sielawa, 91 Misc.2d 778 , 398 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1977). ... Whether the statutory right to recover twice the finance charges under the Federal”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Whether the statutory right to recover twice the finance charges under the Federal Truth In Lending Act may be asserted beyond the one-year statutory limitation is, in our opinion, a legislative decision for Congress. The statute as written provides a one year limitation which we find clear and properly enforceable to bar the recoupment defense here asserted. Congress well knew that most debtors would become aware of creditor violations in the Truth In Lending Act only when the debtor contacts a lawyer to defend a suit on the debt brought by the creditor. The policy decision of whether the penalty of twice the finance charge is an affirmative cause of action or a defense is one best left to the Legislature rather than the courts. Congress presumably enacted the one-year limitation for some reason and they were aware of the realities of consumer credit transactions as indicated above. We are advised by counsel for petitioners than an amendment to the Truth In Lending Act is pending in Congress which would specifically answer the question posed in these cases. We are convinced that the remedy of the petitioners/debtors herein is by a change in the statute.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.