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379 So. 2d 978

Docket No. 78-1270.

Mann v. Stein

David M. MANN, Appellant, v. David J. STEIN, Denise D. Small, and Covenant Development Corporation of Florida, Inc., Appellees.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided January 9, 1980.

Rehearing Denied March 12, 1980.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1980-01-09

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently August 1987

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Further, the rule provides relief where the issue is the right to immediate possession of property. We think this refers to possession by a party with an adverse interest and not to possession by the court.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 470 So. 2d 2 - Thunderbird, Ltd. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., Fla. Reinvestment Corp. v. Cypress Sav.

“an interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court appointing a receiver for appellee corporation.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 470 So. 2d 2 - Thunderbird, Ltd. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1980-01-09

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Judith H. Hayes of Heiman & Heiman, Miami, for appellant.

¶2Richard A. Purdy of Shailer, Purdy & Driver, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court appointing a receiver for appellee corporation.

¶5The review of non-final orders of lower tribunals is severely limited by the terms of Rule 9.130, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The language of the rule specifically includes an order granting, continuing, modifying or dissolving an injunction; it does not specifically refer to the appointment of or the refusal to appoint a receiver. Further, the rule provides relief where the issue is the right to immediate possession of property. We think this refers to possession by a party with an adverse interest and not to possession by the court. It would have been a simple matter to make the appointment of or the refusal to appoint a receiver a basis for review of a non-final order. This was not done, and we are of the opinion that it was intentional. Accordingly, we decline to take jurisdiction.

¶6APPEAL DISMISSED.

¶7HERSEY, J., and CROSS, SPENCER C., Associate Judge, concur.

¶8DAUKSCH, JAMES C., Jr., Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.

¶9DAUKSCH, JAMES C., Jr., Associate Judge, dissenting:

¶10In my opinion we have jurisdiction to review the appealed order so I would not dismiss the appeal. I think the matter should be decided on its merits.

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