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38 Ala. 657

Hardaway v. Semmes

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided January 15, 1863

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1863-01-15

Heard before the Hon. James B. Clark. The bill in this case was filed, on the 10th November, 1857, by Paul J. Semmes, against Robert S. Hardaway, John McKay, Ann C. Cook, and Edward T. Taylor; asking the foreclosure of a mortgage on a slave, which was executed by said Edward T. Taylor to the complainant, and an injunction against the other defendants, who had levied attachments on the slave as the property of said Taylor.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The word 'creditors' is not to be taken with a qualification, and understood to mean 'judgment creditors.' The decision that the phrase, 'bona fide creditors,' occurring in the redemption statute, means judgment creditors, is grounded upon reasoning altogether foreign to the question here. Thomason v. Scales, 12 Ala. 309 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Citizens' Bank v. Pearson

Relies on Wallis v. Rhea · Thomason v. Scales · Jordan v. Mead

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1863-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently October 1927

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 7 state decisions

301863187018801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

A. J. WALKER, C. J.

¶1Mortgages of personal property are by statute inoperative “against creditors and purchasers without notice,” until they are recorded; unless the property is brought into this State subject to the incumbrance, and then four months are allowed for its registration. — Code, 1291. If the property conveyed has a fixed situs within the State at the date of the conveyance, the mortgage falls within the influence of the law, although one or both of the parties may reside in another State. The language of the statute is broad enough to comprehend a mortgage of personalty within the State, the parties being non-residents, and it is not distinguishable as to the policy of its registration from mortgages between residents. There is, therefore, no reason for excepting the mortgage in this casé from the operation of the statute, on account of the non-residence of the parties. The testimony clearly proves, that the slave in controversy had a fixed situs in this State at the date of the mortgage, and had had for some months before. The mortgage was, therefore, inoperative as to that slave against creditors and purchasers without notice, until it was registered.

¶2The statute, in declaring a mortgage inoperative against creditors until it is registered, dates its effective existence as to them from the registration. A creditor, acquiring a lien before that time, has a claim 'superior to that of the mortgage, and against him the mortgage has had, in the estimation of the law, no existence. Such is not only the clear import of the law, but this court has fully settled that as the effect of a statute involving a kindred question. — Gordon v. Mead, 12 Ala. 247; Wallis v. Rhea & Ross, 10 Ala. 451; De Vendell v. Hamilton, 27 ib. 156; Pollard v. Cocke, 19 ib. 188; Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ledyard, 8 ib. 866; Daniells v. Sorrelles, 9 ib. 436.

¶3The word “ creditors” is not to be taken with a qualification, and understood to mean'“judgment creditors.” The decision that the phrase, “ bona-fide creditors,” occurring in the redemption statute, means judgment creditors, *660is grounded upon reasoning altogether foreign to the question here. —Thomason v. Scales, 12 Ala. 309.

¶4We regard the evidence as sufficiently establishing the correctness and consideration of at least one of the debts,, for which the defendant attached the mortgaged slave. That debt is more than sufficient to cover the entire value of the slave, or the proceeds of his sale. It is-, therefore, unnecessary to discuss the question as to the proof of any other debt.

¶5The defendant’s attachment, having been levied- upon the slave before the mortgage was delivered to thé probate judge in this State for registration, is entitled to a priority of satisfaction over the mortgage.

¶6The points decided being conclusive of this case, we need not consider any ©f the other questions argued by counsel.

¶7The decree of the chancellor is reversed, and a decree must be here rendered dismissing the bill) and the complainant must pay the costs, both of this court, and the court below.

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