Volume 38 — Appeals, District of Columbia

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents sustaining a petition for the cancelation of a trademark registration. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Patents; Interference; Appeal and Error; New Trial; Res Judicata.</p> <p>1. In an interference between several parties, the right to a patent is a species of property the title to which is claimed exclusively by each of the parties as against all of the others; and an award of priority to one is a final judgment in his favor as against them. From that decision each of the unsuccessful parties may appeal.</p> <p>2. On a motion to dismiss an appeal in an interference case, the power of the Commissioner of Patents to grant new trials or vacate final judgments after the time for rehearing provided for in the rules of the Patent Office shall have expired, not being involved, was assumed to exist.</p> <p>3. Ordinarily, an order by a trial court granting a new trial or a rehearing as to part of the issues, or as to some of the parties, has the effect to reopen the entire case to a new trial as to all of the issues and all of the parties. But it may be that the order for a new trial may be limited in its effect, where some of the issues are so distinct from the others that they may be retried separately without complication, or where the rights of the parties are so separate and distinct that the issues between them may be retried without affecting the rights of another party.</p> <p>4. Where, after a decision by the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case between Land, Browne, and Dyson, awarding priority to Dyson, and after the time for appeal therefrom had expired, the Commissioner, on the petition of Land and Dyson, reopened the interference, and upon Dyson’s conceding the priority of Land, awarded priority to Land over the opposition of Browne, who thereupon appealed to this court; it was held, denying a motion by Dyson to dismiss the appeal, that the effect of the last decision was to set aside the first, and to award priority to Land over Browne as well as Dyson, and that it was therefore a final decision adjudicating the rights of all of the parties, from which Browne had the right of appeal.</p>

<p>Motion to remit bill of exceptions, and suggestion of diminution of record, and motion for writ of certiorari.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe relator from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, overruling a demurrer to the answer of the Secretary of the Navy to a petition for the writ of mandamus, and, the relator electing to stand upon his petition, dismissing the petition.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe accused from a judgment of conviction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a criminal prosecution for forgery. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by property owners from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a District Court, confirming the verdict of a jury of award in a condemnation proceeding. The Court in the opinion stated the fac.ts as follows: This is an appeal from a judgment confirming the verdict of a jury in a condemnation proceeding.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe relator from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a petition for the writ of mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, upon a verdict for tbe defendant directed by tbe Court, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a bill for an injunction.

Hearing oil an appeal by tbe United States from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, sitting as a criminal court, sustaining pleas in abatement to and quashing an indictment charging tbe accused with the offenses of obtaining money by false pretenses and embezzlement.

<p>Patents ; Interferences ; Concurrent Decisions of the Patent Office ; Operativeness of Device.</p> <p>1. Concurrent decisions of the Patent Office tribunals on questions of fact in interferences are entitled to very great weight, and will not be disturbed except for manifest error, especially in cases involving complicated construction, about which the experts of the Patent Office are less liable to err than this court. (Following Lindmwi-k V. Sodghmson, 31 App. D. O. 612.)</p> <p>2. Where the question on an appeal in an interference case was whether the drawings and specifications of the application of the appellees showed an operative machine, as they failed to show certain guiding devices similar to those disclosed by the appellant, and all of the tribunals of the Patent Office concurred than an operative machine was shown, — the decision of the Commissioner of Patents was affirmed, on the ground that it could not be said that it was the result of manifest error.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Patents; Interference; Diligence.</p> <p>The junior party to an interference, who was the first to conceive, disclosed the invention about May 25, 1907, and filed his application November 29, 1907. The senior party disclosed about June 15, 1907, and filed July 22, 1907. Neither party actually reduced to practice. The delay of the junior party in filing his application after disclosure was in large part caused by his making an investigation in the Patent Office to determine whether the invention would be an infringement upon any prior existing patent. It was held that such investigation did not constitute a proper excuse for delay; and that he was lacking in diligence, — there being no distinction between delay for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is infringement, and delay for mere business purposes of exploiting an invention before making an application.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents, rejecting an application for a patent. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from decisions of the Commissioner of Patents in interference cases.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Patents; Interference.</p> <p>This ease is governed by the decision of the Court in O’Connor v. Bettendorf, ante, 105.</p>

<p>Patents; Interference.</p> <p>This case is governed by the decisions of the Court in O’Connor v. Betten~ dorf, ante, 105.</p>

<p>Hearing on. an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Saxes; Contracts; Oeeer and Acceptance; Goods to 5se Manueactured; Revocation.</p> <p>1. Acceptance of an offer to purchase goods, or of an order for goods, must be affirmatively made, and cannot be implied from mere lapse of time (following Meteler v. Harry Kaufman Go. 32 App. D. C. 434); and an offer made, without consideration, may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance.</p> <p>2. Where goods are ordered to be manufactured, and the order is taken subject to acceptance, a promissory note given by the purchaser is conditional upon acceptance, and until such acceptance is without consideration; and a provision in such an order that a countermand will not ho accepted is also without consideration, and not binding upon the purchaser.</p> <p>3. A purchaser wdio has ordered goods to he manufactured is not responsible for anything done by the seller looking to the fulfilment of the order, if he countermands the order before its acceptance.</p> <p>4. A letter from ono who has ordered goods to be manufactured, stating he finds he does not need them and desires to have the order canceled, amounts to a revocation of the order.</p> <p>5. A notice of countermand of an order for goods to be manufactured, given before acceptance to the District manager here of a foreign manufacturing company, is sufficient to discharge the purchaser from liability to the company on the order, where the manager maintained an office here as such, and received the order from the purchaser, and forwarded it to the company.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by certain jail prisoners from an order of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, certifying its assent to tbe previous removal of jail prisoners from the jail to the workhouse. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court vf the District of Columbia, overruling a demurrer to a petition by the United States District. Attorney to vacate a previous order admitting the respondent to citizenship, and, the respondent declining to answer,- vacating the order and canceling the certificate of citizenship.

<p>Divorce; Adultery; Evidence; Admissions.</p> <p>1. On an appeal by a corespondent in a divorce suit, from that part of the decree of divorce which found that he had committed adultery with the defendant, the evidence was reviewed and found to sustain the finding, it appearing, among other things, that he and the defendant had, on several occasions, occupied the same rooms together as man and wife in a boarding house and a hotel.</p> <p>2. The admission in evidence by the court below of a confession by one of two corespondents in a divorce suit, cannot properly be made the basis of an assignment of error by the other corespondent on an appeal by him from that part of the decree of divorce finding that he had committed adultery with the defendant.</p> <p>3. The admissions of a wife charged with adultery are properly received in evidence against her in a suit for divorce by her husband, if they were freely made. (Following Michalowicz v. Michalowicz, 25 App. D. C. 484.)</p> <p>4. It is doubtful whether a correspondent in a divorce suit on an appeal by him from that part of the decree of divorce finding that he had been guilty of adultery with the defendant can properly assign as error that the court below erred in not inferring condonation by the plaintiff of the alleged offense of the wife.</p> <p>5. On an appeal by a corespondent in a divorce suit from a part of the decree granting a divorce to the complainant, it was held that there was no evidence to sustain the contention that the suit was collusive between the husband and wife, and the decree was affirmed.</p>

Hearing or an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, in an action by the United States to recover money alleged to have been paid to the defendant under a mistake of law. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from a judgment for the appellee, plaintiff below, in the supreme court of the District, under the seventy-third rule.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, upon verdict, in an action ex contractu. Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe facts as follows: Tbis is an appeal from a judgment in tbe supreme court of tbe District upon a verdict for tbe plaintiff, Caleb W. W. Fuller, appellee bere, in an action growing out of a contract.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff, the District of Columbia, from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in an action of debt. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing oh an appeal by tbe plaintiffs from an order of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, overruling a motion in arrest of judgment. Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe facts as follows: Tbis is an action of replevin begun in tbe justice’s court September 28, 1908, by tbe appellants Wallace and Sbepberd, trustees in a ebattel deed of trust executed by Degree to tbem to secure, one William Fennell in tbe payment of eighteen notes aggregating $424.80.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, upon verdict, in an action to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of an assault and battery committed upon her by the agents of the defendant.

Heabing on. an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, upon verdict, in an action of trespass. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, upon an agreed statement of facts, in an action to recover salary alleged to be due to the plaintiff as a public school teacher. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from the judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia in favor of appellee, Mildred. Dean, plaintiff below.

Hearing or an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action on promissory notes. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for injury to real property. Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe facts as follows: Appellee, Jacob Karr, hereafter referred to as plaintiif, brought this action in tbe supreme court of tbe District of Columbia to recover damages for injury to real estate.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sustaining a demurrer to a declaration for slander and assault, and, the plaintiff electing not to amend, dismissing the suit. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an action by Harry Friedlander for damages for slander and assault, in a declaration containing four counts.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing an appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court. The facts are stated in the opinions.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict directed by the Court, in an action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an action for damages for personal injuries resulting in death, brought by Georgia Sprow, the administratrix of the decedent, against his employer, Orrin G. Staples.

Hearing oil cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a probate court; one of the appeals being by petitioners who sought to have waivers of citation signed by them set aside for fraud, and the probate of a will vacated; the other appeal being by the executors under the will from so much of the order as directed the petition to stand as a caveat to the will as a will of real estate.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, overruling a motion to quash the service of process, in an action for breach of warranty. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from an order in the supreme court of the District, overruling appellant’s motion to quash the service of process.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for breach of a contract for work and materials furnished. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: The appellee, Emilio Jaselli, Trading as Jaselli & Brothers, plaintiff below, filed a declaration in assumpsit, against Leo Simmons, containing three counts: 1.

Hearing on an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for injuries to personal property alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action for personal injuries. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Equity; Evidence; Laches; Injunction; Judgments; Res Judicata</p> <p>1. Difficulty in obtaining evidence relating to proceedings terminating in a tax deed under wbicb a lot owner claims title affords no grounds for resort to a court of equity in a controversy with the owner of the record title to the land. Proof of lost records and papers may be as readily obtained in an action at law as in a suit in equity; the difficulties in producing the necessary evidence being the same in both ■ courts.</p> <p>2. Laches, although a good defense in equity, is no defense at law, and where a claimant of land is asserting a legal title in a court of law, no lapse of time can avail his adversary, save adverse possession for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations.</p> <p>3. A claim by the complainant in an equity suit to enjoin the prosecution of an action of ejectment, that the plaintiff in the action is es-topped to claim the land in controversy by reason of the expenditure of money by the complainant on the land, encouraged by the other party’s long failure to assert title and his failure to pay taxes, will not give the equity court jurisdiction. If such facts can be shown to amount to an estoppel in pais, that defense is available in the action of ejectment. (Following Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 8 App. L>. C. 10.)</p> <p>4. Former adjudications of the title of land between rival claimants therefor are as available for the party seeking them at law as in equity. The principles applicable are the same at equity as in law, and the effect is the same.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting an application for a patent. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on.an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing ou an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents denying an application for the registration of a trademark.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Patents; Interference; Amendments and Disclosure; Appeal and Error.</p> <p>1. The rule requiring preliminary statements in an interference is a salutary one, its object being to elicit from each of the parties certain vital information before either party is informed as to the statements of the other. Owing to the purpose of the rule, the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in passing upon motions to amend such statements will not be disturbed, unless it is plain that there has. been an abuse of that discretion.</p> <p>2. In an interference involving an invention for maintaining electrical excitation for single-phase rectifiers, where the junior party, who had. alleged dates of conception and reduction to practice later than, those alleged by the senior party, claimed the right to amend his preliminary statement so as to substitute an earlier date, which coincided with the date of an earlier application upon which he had received a patent, which application he contended disclosed the invention of the issue, a decision of the Commissioner of Patents awarding priority to the senior party was affirmed, it appearing, among other things, that the junior party, who conceded that the drawings, of his earlier application did not of themselves disclose the invention,, amended his second application by inserting therein language in- " tended to bring his invention within the issues of the interference,, at which time the application of the senior party had been on file-for nearly a year.</p> <p>3. Concurrent decisions of the Patent Office will not be disturbed by this. court on appeal, unless obvious error has occurred; especially where-complicated electrical devices are involved. (Following Lmdmarh v.. Hodgkmson, 31 App. D. C. 612, and Wemtraub v. Hewitt, ante, 82.)</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting certain claims of an application for a reissue of a patent. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, upon a verdict directed by the court, in an action for slander.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal by Delia Brice from a judgment in the supreme court of the District upon a directed verdict for the defendant, Austin M. Curtis, appellee here. The action was for slander.</p> <p>According to plaintiff’s testimony, she contracted a severe cold in March, 1909, from the effects of which she continued to suffer until about the 27th day of May of that year, when, accompanied by her sister, she went to the office of the defendant, a practising physician of this city, to obtain treatment.* The defendant gave her a prescription and directed her what to do in addition to taking the medicine. He also instructed her to return later if not relieved. Becoming no better, she returned on the 3d of June, following, accompanied by her sister, “for medical advice as to the reason she did not have her usual sickness and for treatment in respect thereof.” The defendant, upon being informed by the plaintiff that she was no better, suggested that it would be necessary to examine her. After the examination he said: “You are in a delicate state and you are about three months gone.” The plaintiff denied that such was her condition, whereupon the defendant in support of his diagnosis alluded to certain alleged differences between plaintiff’s physical development and that of her sister. The sister then suggested: “Doctor, probably she is at the changing point,” whereupon the doctor asked plaintiff’s age, and, upon being informed that it was thirty-eight years, said in effect that her condition was not attributable to that. After more argument the doctor asked: “Do you dispute my twenty-seven years of practice?” — and, upon being answered in the affirmative, said: “Well, come and stand before the X-ray tomorrow, and I will prove that it is so, and if I do not, I will give you $200.” Plaintiff did not accede to the doctor’s suggestion. She did consult another physician whose medicine relieved her, but did not change her condition. Plaintiff, of course, denied that she was pregnant.</p> <p>The testimony of the sister did not differ materially from that of the plaintiff. She stated that the doctor, upon the occasion of the second visit, invited plaintiff into his private office, and that she, the witness, accompanied her sister “at her request.” The doctor whom plaintiff subsequently consulted testified that, in his opinion, plaintiff was suffering from change of life. The lady by whom plaintiff had been employed as maid testified as to plaintiff’s reputation for chastity, and, when another witness was offered upon this point, counsel for the defendant announced that they were willing to concede that plaintiff’s reputation in this respect was good.</p> <p>At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff the court, upon motion of the defendant, ruled that the statements made were “privileged communications, and that theré had been no sufficient publication shown to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff.” A verdict was accordingly directed for the defendant, and plaintiff excepted.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Plaintiff, Edward Warren, an employee of the ThompsonStarrett Company, brought this action against the latter to recover damages for personal injuries sustained through defendant’s negligence in failing to provide him a safe place to work.

Hearing on a motion by the appellee to dismiss an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a bankruptcy court. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on tbe appeal by tbe accused from a judgment of conviction of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, in a prosecution for embezzlement.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>PATENTS; INTERFERENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; REDUCTION TO PRACTICE; Evidence.</p> <p>1. A party to an interference who did not file his application until after a patent had been granted to his opponent, and who was the last to conceive, must prove his prior reduction to practice beyond a reasonable doubt.</p> <p>2. In an interference relating to an improvement in the construction of back axles in motor vehicles, and in, which the burden of proving reduction to practice beyond a reasonable doubt was on the junior party, it was held that he had failed to discharge such burden, where he showed that a test run had been made with an automobile equipped with the device of the issue, but failed to show that the device had fulfilled its purpose on such run; and where it also appeared that the invention was sufficiently complex to require a test to demonstrate its practicability, and especially as he was in a position to prove, beyond question, the facts upon which he sought to establish his right to a patent, but failed to do so.</p> <p>3. The uncorroborated testimony of one of, the parties to an interference is not sufficient to show reduction to practice.</p> <p>4. It must be presumed that evidence in the control of a party to an interference, and not produced by him, was unfavorable to his case.</p>

<p>Patents; Interference; Disclosure; Appeal and Error; Specification and Claims.</p> <p>1. In an interference in which is involved the question whether the prior application of one of the parties disclosed the invention of the issue, it will be assumed that the tribunals of the Patent Office considered all of the figures of a drawing attached to the application, although they seem to have based their opinion on some only of the figures.</p> <p>2. In an interference involving a highly technical invention, and in which this court does not have the benefit of the testimony of witnesses highly skilled in the art, it will not reverse the unanimous decisions of the Patent Office, unless it is clearly apparent that error has been committed.</p> <p>3. Where the issue of an interference called for a plurality of positive electrodes, and was not limited to the number shown in the applications of the parties, it was held that the application of one of the parties, which showed a device containing two primary and two secondary electrodes, the inductances, however, being in only the secondary leads, disclosed the invention of the issue.</p> <p>4. Where one of the counts of an interference called for “an inductance introduced into each of the leads of the positive electrodes,” it was held that an application of one of the parties which placed inductances in the leads to the secondary, and not to the primary positive electrodes, did not disclose the invention of the issue.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, entered upon motion by tbe plaintiff for want of an affidavit of defense in an action to recover a deposit made on a contract to sell land. Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe facts as follows: George W. Marsb sued John O. Evans, to recover $200.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the accused from a judgment of conviction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as a criminal.court, in a homicide case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

.Hearing on an appeal by tbe accused from a judgment of conviction of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia in a prosecution for fraudulently taking away and concealing records of a corporation and embezzling its funds. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.

Hearing on an, appeal by the accused from a judgment of conviction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a criminal court, in a prosecution for murder. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: The appellant, Antonio Sacrini, was indicted for the murder of one Charles J. Chipman, found guilty of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Hearing on an appeal by the relator from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a. petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, the Superintendent of Insurance of the District of Columbia, to issue him a solicitor’s license. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Condemnation of Insanitary Buildings; Instructions to Jury of Award; Damages; Statute.</p> <p>1. It is error for the lower court, in an order appointing a board of award to assess damages claimed to be due by a property owner for buildings condemned by the Board for the Condemnation of Insanitary Buildings, to instruct the board to limit the amount of compensation, if any, to be awarded the property owner, to the value of the materials in the buildings condemned. (Construing act of Congress of May 1, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 157, chap. 2073, providing for the condemnation of insanitary buildings in the District of Columbia.)</p> <p>2. Where a building has been condemned as insanitary by the Board for the Condemnation of Insanitary Buildings in the District of Columbia, the owner may apply to the court to have the order of condemnation vacated, or he may apply for the appointment by the court of a board to award damages (following Metzger v. Marlcham, 36 App. D. C. 212); and if he pursues the latter course, he waives no right to claim full compensation, including damages for loss of rent; and if the board of condemnation has found that the buildings could not be repaired, the property owner is not precluded from claiming that the cost of repair should be considered by the board of award. In assessing damages the board must be governed by the circumstances of each case. (Construing act of Congress of May 1, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 157, chap. 2073, providing for the condemnation of insanitary buildings in the District of Columbia.)</p> <p>3. In instructing a board appointed to assess damages to a property owner for the destruction of buildings condemned as insanitary under the act of Congress of May 1, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 157, chap. 2073), the court should require the board to make a separate finding under each of the three grounds upon which the statute permits damages to be awarded.</p> <p>4. As the act of Congress of May 1, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 157, chap. 2073), providing for the condemnation of insanitary buildings in the District of Columbia, contemplates the taking of property for the public good, it should be liberally construed in favor of the owner of the property sought to be condemned.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by the court, in an action to recover damages for breach of contract. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is a suit for damages for an alleged breach of contract. Appellant, James L. Parsons, plaintiff below, filed a declaration in two counts, — the first in assumpsit, and the second in covenant.

Hearing oil an appeal by tbe complainants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity to establish rights claimed by the complainants in a decedent’s estate.

Hearing on appeals from decrees of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as an equity court, in two causes consolidated for hearing. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: These are appeals from decrees after the consolidation of the two above entitled and numbered suits, sustaining the bill in No. 2363, and dismissing that in No. 2364.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia sustaining a demurrer to a declaration for libel and 'slander,. and dismissing tbe action, tbe plaintiff electing not to amend.

Hearing on an appeal by one of several defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as an equity court, in a suit for the construction of a deed in trust.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by tbe Court, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.

Petition for an order directing the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to stay the execution of an order awarding the custody of a child. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as an equity court, construing a will.

Hearing on an appeal by one of two defendants from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, sitting as a court of equity, in a creditors’ suit to subject certain real estate to the payment of a judgment.

Hearing on an appeal by one of several defendants from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, under tho I3d rule of that court, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in an action on a promissory note. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in accordance with the 13d common-law rule of the supreme court of the District of Columbia.

Hearing upon, a certification of a judge of the Police Court under sec. 933, D. C. Code, of a question for determination by this court. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing oil an appeal from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia dismissing a petition for tbe writ of mandamus against tbe Secretary of tbe Navy.

Hearing on an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as an equity court, dismissing a bill of complaint for a discovery and an accounting. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Appellant, Marion M. Fowler, plaintiff below, appeals from a decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia dismissing his bill of complaint upon demurrer.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in a trademark interference proceeding. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Patents; Renewal Applications; Powers op Attorney.</p> <p>1. Under see. 4897, Rev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3386, permitting an inventor or assignee who has failed to obtain a patent by reason of nonpayment of the final fee, “to make an application for a patent for such invention or discovery the same as in the ease of an original application,” it is not necessary for the applicant or assignee, after such failure, to file a new application; but a mere petition to renew the original application, as provided for by rule 176 of the Patent Office, is sufficient. The words quoted have reference to the status of the application after renewal. It may then be examined upon its merits, and the patent granted or withheld “as in the case of an original application.” (Citing Cutler v. Leonard, 31 App. D. C. 297.)</p> <p>2. An attorney of record for an applicant for a patent, who has filed with the original application the customary power of attorney to prosecute the application, eontining full power of substitution and revocation and the right to make alterations and amendments therein, has authority to file on behalf of the applicant a petition for renewal.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents denying an application to revive an application for a patent. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: On January 8, 1900, Hugo Mattullath filed an application for a patent for a flying machine. His home was then in the city of New York, where his family then, and has since, resided.

<p>PATENTS; INTERFERENCE; REDUCTION TO PRACTICE.</p> <p>In an interference involving a rotary blower designed to be installed in the wall of a steam boiler-setting, opposite the flue openings, and to be used for the purpose of cleaning the flues, a decision of the Commissioner of Patents awarding priority to the senior party was affirmed, where it appeared that he was the first to conceive; that the junior party, who had alleged in his preliminary statement a date of reduction to practice subsequent to that alleged by the senior party, sought to amend by substituting an earlier date, but that leave to do so had been denied; that even if he had been granted leave to so amend, his testimony fell short of proving a reduction to practice earlier than the date he alleged; and that, in view of the comparatively simple nature of the invention, of his facilities for perfecting it, and the reasons assigned for his failure to act with greater diligence, the junior party was lacking in diligence.</p>

<p>Patents; Patentability.</p> <p>Claims of an application for an incandescent filament for electric lamps, comprising a stable electrically conducting mixture of osmium and described oxides, rare eartb, and tboroxide, held to be anticipated by a patent for an incandescent conductor for an electric lamp, in which the patentee described his conductor as consisting of ruthenium incorporated with oxides of zirconium, where the applicant in his specification conceded that ruthenium and the oxide of zirconium were the equivalents of osmium and the oxide of theorium, and that one might be used in the place of the other.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents denying registration of a trademark. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Patents; Interference; Evidence.</p> <p>1. Where the claims of an interference relating to paper bottles or liquid containers call for the stitching of the walls of the paper receptacle prior to the application of paraffin, and for two or more parallel and vertical lines of stitching, an exhibit of one of the parties was held to respond to the issue, although it had not been paraffined, and contained but one row of stitching, as it was well known that such paper receptacles must be paraffined to render them impervious to water, and, given the idea of stitching, the double row became mere mechanical development.</p> <p>2. While the fact that the testimony of a witness for one of the parties to an interference would have merely been cumulative, will not alone be a sufficient reason for not calling him, the fact that he is the attorney for the party is sufficient, as counsel who would knowingly elicit false testimony would not be likely to hesitate to add his own testimony to that of a witness who had already testified.</p> <p>3. A decision of the Commissioner of Patents awarding priority to the junior party as to certain claims of an interference, involving a paper bottle or liquid container, was reversed, upon a review of the evidence, upon the ground that it failed to show that the junior party had sustained the burden of proof that was upon him, although the testimony on behalf of the senior party was not as clear and convincing as it might have been.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting certain claims in an application for a patent.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents, sustaining an opposition to the registration of a trademark. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents dismissing an opposition to the registration of a trademark. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in a trademark interference case. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Patents; Patentability; Operativeness; Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. Gold v. Gold, 34 App. D. C. 229, referred to.</p> <p>2. A decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting an application for a method of steam heating was affirmed as anticipated by another patent, where it appeared that the Primary Examiner, by direction of the Commissioner, witnessed a demonstration of an apparatus constructed in accordance with such patent, and supported his decision against the applicant by an affidavit showing the operativeness of the apparatus; that the applicant filed no counter affidavits, as he might have done under rule 76 of the Patent Office; and it waa further held that, while the' failure of the applicant to file such counter affidavits did not preclude this court from considering the merits of his appeal, it did impose upon him the burden of very clearly establishing error.</p>

<p>Appeal and Error; Special Appeals.</p> <p>Where a special appeal from an interlocutory order of the lower court, if allowed, could not have been heard by this court in regular course until after tbe summer recess, during which time a final decree could be entered by the lower court and an appeal regularly taken, an application for such an appeal was denied.</p>

<p>Patents; Interference; Disclosure.</p> <p>1. Where concurrent decisions of the Patent Office in an interference case are to the effect that earlier applications of one of the parties do not disclose the invention of the issue, they will not be disturbed by this court on appeal, unless it is clearly apparent that error has been committed; especially where the invention is of a highly technical nature.</p> <p>2. In an interference involving an invention relating to mercury vapor lamps, in which certain of the issues called for the positive and the filamentary electrodes to be “electrically disconnected,” it was held, affirming a decision of the Commissioner, that a prior application of one of the parties showing a positive and a filamentary electrode, but also showing that they were in connection at all times when the lamp was not in operation, and necessarily in operation when the lamp was started, did not disclose the invention of the issues.</p>

Criminal Law; Insanity; Commitment of Insane Prisoners; Habeas Corpus. Hearing on an appeal by tbe petitioner from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia overruling his demurrer to a return by the superintendent of the government hospital for the insane to a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, and remanding the petition to the custody of the respondent.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia on a verdict directed by tbe Court in an action of ejectment.

Hearing on an appeal bj the accused from a judgment of conviction, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a criminal term, in a prosecution charging the accused with having had carnal knowledge of two females under sixteen years of age. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by a creditor of a decedent’s estate from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, overruling a report of the auditor stating the account of the administratrix, and confirming the report.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding an equity court, granting an injunction restraining the defendant from infringing certain patents. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by the court, in an action to recover damages for alleged personal injuries.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by the court, in an action of ejectment. The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows: Mary S. Rowlett, plaintiff in an action of ejectment to recover possession of lot 5 in square 611 of the city of Washington, appeals from a judgment on a directed verdict for the defendant, Pranklin P. Nash. William Mayse is the common source of title.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by the court, in an action by a husband to recover damages for the loss of his wife’s services.