38 Cal. 3d 18 - Mann v. Cracchiolo’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 433 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 444 later decisions — most recently June 2019 · most notably 46 Cal. 3d 1092 - Leal v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity (1988), 14 Cal. 4th 479 - Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996)
1 federal appellate · 433 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 31 Cal. 3d 362 - Lipson v. Superior Court · 19 Cal. 2d 553 - Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice · Walsh v. Walsh · 63 Cal. 2d 849 - Weitz v. Yankosky · 20 Cal. 3d 285 - Varjabedian v. City of Madera
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 444 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The trial court's determination of whether a witness qualifies as an expert is a matter of discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse. [Citation.] ' "Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The summary judgment procedure, inasmuch as it denies the right of the adverse party to a trial, is drastic and should be used with caution. ( Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice (1942) 19 Cal.2d 553, 556 [ 122 P.2d 264 ].)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““[W]e [reject] ‘an invariable rule which would require in all cases that an expert must have acquired a personal, working knowledge of the standard of care at the precise time when the alleged malpractice occurred.’ The court reasoned in part: ‘While a layman may not testify to a fact which he has learned only by reading a medical book, there is no question that a professional physician may rely upon medical texts as the basis for his testimony. [Citations.] Wigmore justifies the foregoing distinction by pointing out that a medical doctor possesses a professional experience which gives him a knowledge of the trustworthy authorities and the proper sources of information, as well as a degree of personal observation of the general subject enabling him to estimate the plausibility of the views expressed. Furthermore, he opines, it may be impossible to obtain information, on the particular matter except through the reported data. [Citation.] ... [11] ‘The unmistakable general trend in recent years has been toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of medical experts. Thus, whereas a number of earlier cases held that a physician of necessity must possess the skill ordinarily practiced only in the same locality [citation], only six years later this requirement was relaxed so that a physician was deemed qualified as an expert if he could testify to the practice in a similar community. [Citation.] Some early cases were unbending in requiring expertise as”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.