¶1I dissent. Effective January 1, 1982, the Legislature in essence mandated the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to revoke the driver’s license of any person previously convicted of three or more drunk driving offenses despite his participation in an alcoholism rehabilitation program. (See Veh. Code, §§ 13352, 13352.5, 23171, 23176.) The majority refuses to enforce the new law with respect to persons whose third offense occurred prior to its effective date, even though their conviction of that offense occurred thereafter. The majority reasons that such a result would constitute a retroactive application of the new law, that the Legislature failed to specify that it intended such a result, and that a retroactive application possibly might run afoul of constitutional ex post facto principles.
¶2In light of the obvious menace to public safety posed by drunken drivers, it is patently clear to me that the Legislature intended its new mandatory revocation law to apply to everyone to the extent constitutionally permitted. What possible reason could the Legislature have had to make its new protective legislation prospective only? The provision is based on the rather elementary proposition that persons who have been repeatedly convicted of drunken driving are a serious threat to public safety and should lose their driving privileges whether or not they enroll, belatedly, in some noble rehabilitation program.
¶3Would a retroactive application of the new law offend ex post facto principles? I think not. Certainly the Legislature is empowered to determine a driver’s present fitness to drive a car, based upon his or her past driving record. Just as a state agency may revoke a professional license for misconduct occurring prior to enactment of the statute authorizing revocation (Murrill v. State Board of Accountancy (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 709, 711 [218 P.2d 569]), so too may the Legislature “retroactively” determine that a driver with a substantial history of drunk driving episodes should be denied further driving privileges. No forbidden ex post facto law is involved here, especially since the third or “triggering” conviction was entered after the new law went into effect.
¶4Moreover, as Presiding Justice Puglia stated in his opinion written for the Court of Appeal in this case, “It is well established . . . that statutes which provide for the suspension or revocation of licenses, are not penal statutes *632subject to ex post facto prohibition, even though they may require the consideration of past offenses. Such statutes are intended to protect the public rather than to punish licensees. (Foster v. Police Commissioners (1894) 102 Cal. 483, 490-491 [37 P. 763]; Furnish v. Board of Medical Examiners (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 326, 330-331 [308 P.2d 924]; Murrill v. State Board of Accountancy [supra]97 Cal.App.2d 709, 711-712; Ellis v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 753, 758-759 [125 P.2d 521]; Beamon v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 200, 210 [4 Cal.Rptr. 396].)”
¶5I would reverse the judgment and remand with directions to enter judgment for the DMV.