¶1dissenting:
¶2Supreme Court Rule 412(h), quoted in the majority opinion, specifically permits the trial court in its discretion to require disclosure of relevant material and information not expressly covered by the rule. As I view this record, that is what the trial court did here. I find no basis whatsoever for the conclusion reached by the majority that such order was unreasonable and beyond the limited scope of the rule.
¶3Furthermore, in People v. Crawford, 114 Ill. App. 2d 230, 252 N.E.2d 483, this court specifically held that a trial court had authority to order extensive pretrial discovery and that such authority was not limited to items of physical evidence of witnesses’ statements when such discovery was necessary to insure the defendant a fair trial. The decision in Crawford antedated the rule for discovery in criminal cases.
¶4I would affirm the order of the trial court for discovery. It does not follow, however, that the judgment of contempt and the sentence imposed must be affirmed. Here, as in Crawford, and as in People v. Endress, 106 Ill. App. 2d 217, 245 N.E.2d 26, it is apparent that the noncompliance with the discovery order was a good faith condition precedent to ascertain the nature and scope of the authority of the trial court to order discovery. In view of that, I would vacate the judgment of contempt.